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[Abstract] The paper examines the rationale for ”aid for trade” (AfT), starting with a re-
view of developments in the ﬁeld and institutions involved. A statistical analysis attempts to 
trace for which countries there has not been a positive relationship between trade and devel-
opment. The results indicate that for 40 countries, representing 2/3 of the world population, 
there has been a positive relationship between trade openness and growth. The relationship 
has however been negative for 15 countries representing 3% of the world population, and 
not so clear for the rest (around 100 countries, covering 30% of the world population). For 
the negative cases, the ”problems with trade” are the same as the ”problems with growth”, 
so AfT should be granted in conjunction with help for economic development in general. 
AfT related to supply-side limitations should be given not only to the LDCs (Least Devel-
oped Countries); other classiﬁcations in fact serve better in order to trace those with the 
greatest need for AfT.
Arne Melchior
Aid for Trade and the Post-
Washington Confusion

                                                                   Aid for Trade and the Post-Washington Confusion     1  
  
Summary* 
 
The paper examines some core issues related to aid for trade (AfT); 
departing from a brief review of the rapid expansion of such aid in recent 
years. There is a broadly accepted need for aid related to trade institution 
building and the implementation of WTO agreements, and AfT may be 
scaled up for this purpose. Beyond this, there is uncertainty about the level 
of ambition for AfT, and the paper attempts to assess the scale of the 
problems that AfT is supposed to remedy.  
An analysis of the relationship between openness and income suggests 
that 1/10 of the countries, representing 3% of the world population, have a 
“problem with trade” in the sense that openness and income are negatively 
correlated, and growth has been slow. On the other hand; for 28% of  the 
countries, representing 2/3 of the world population, the relationship 
between trade openness and income over time is clearly positive. Hence 
on average, the relationship between trade and growth is positive even if 
there is a considerable middle ground where the relationship is not so 
clear-cut. 
The existence of a negative relationship between trade and growth for 
some countries provides a rationale for AfT related to the supply-capacity 
of countries. Our analysis suggests that the “problems with trade” are the 
same as the “problems with growth”. Hence there is no specific AfT that 
can solve these problems, and aid for supply-side development should 
therefore be provided on a long-term basis and coordinated with other aid, 
as suggested by the recent task force on aid for trade. The experience with 
AfT implementation so far suggest that such aid has to be scaled up 
gradually, building on existing channels and coordinating better,  rather 
that creating a new AfT mega-facility overnight.  
A third type of AfT is related to adjustment to trade liberalisation. It is 
argued that transitional AfT might be given in order to compensate for 
preference erosion. AfT related to the erosion of tax revenue may also be 
important for some low-income countries.  
According to the paper, the targeted countries should vary across 
different types of AfT. In order to reach the countries that are most needy 
in terms of supply-side limitations, the lists of “IDA only” or low-income 
countries are better than the LDC (Least Developed Countries) list. 
Furthermore, non-members of WTO seem to have larger “problems with 
trade” than members, and this underlines the importance of AfT related to 
WTO accession. The analysis provides support for the proposal by the 
AfT task force to create new funding mechanisms for AfT to non-LDC 
developing countries. 
                                                 
* The paper was written for NORAD (the Norwegian Development Agency) and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Funding under the NORAD/NUPI framework 
agreement for research is gratefully acknowledged. I thank staff members of the NORAD 
and the Ministry for useful comments to an earlier draft. As always, the responsibility for 
remaining errors stays with the author. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the ”Washington consensus” around 1990, trade liberalisation in rich as 
well as poor countries was a top priority.1 15 years later, trade optimism is 
bleaker, the worries have increased, and there is a search for a new 
consensus: 
 ”We cannot ignore the costs of adjustment, particularly for the developing 
countries, and the problems that can arise with the opening up of markets. 
These adjustments must not be relegated to the future: they must be an 
integral part of the opening-up agenda. We must create a new “Geneva 
consensus”: a new basis for the opening up of trade that takes into account 
the resultant cost of adjustment. Trade opening is necessary, but it is not 
sufficient in itself. It also implies assistance: to help the least-developed 
countries to build up their stocks and therefore adequate productive and 
logistical capacity; to increase their capacity to negotiate and to implement 
the commitments undertaken in the international trading system; and to deal 
with the imbalances created between winners and losers from trade opening 
— imbalances that are the more dangerous to the more fragile economies, 
societies or countries. Building the capacity they need to take advantage of 
open markets or helping developing countries to adjust is now part of our 
common global agenda.”  
The statement is not from some anti-globalisation activist; it is from 
WTOs Director-General Pascal Lamy.2 But while Lamy is searching for 
the new consensus, the actual situation is one of dissonance, discontent 
and confusion. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) has collapsed, and 
it is at the time of writing (November 2006) uncertain when or whether it 
will be resumed. While the Uruguay Round (UR) of the WTO was 
conceived in the trade optimism of the Washington consensus, DDA has 
collapsed in the Post-Washington confusion.  
An illustration of the ambiguity in perceptions is UNCTAD’s Trade 
and Development Report 2006 (UNCTAD 2006a), which is partly an anti-
WTO manifesto, with explicit or at least implicit critique of several WTO 
agreements as well as the plans for manufacturing tariff reductions in the 
current WTO round. At UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Board 
Meeting on 27 Sepember 2006, Pascal Lamy spent parts of his statement 
arguing against the report’s analysis. Ironically, the UNCTAD report bears 
the signature of Secretary-General Supachai Panitchpakdi of UNCTAD – 
the former WTO Director-General!3  
In this situation, Aid for Trade has become a new buzzword, 
sometimes almost like a magic wand.4 AfT should not only teach the poor 
                                                 
1 The expression ”Washington consensus” was first used to describe the policy 
recommendations of the international financial  institutions  toward Latin America 
around 1990. The exact content of this consensus is actually not so clear (see e.g. 
Williamson 2000), but trade liberalisation is normally on the list. As an example, see e.g. 
the World Development Report 1987 (World Bank 1987). 
2 Pascal Lamy: ”Humanising globalisation”, speech in Santiago de Chile, 30 January 
2006, see www.wto.org.  
3 Lamy’s statement, and the response from Supachai the day after, are available at 
WTO’s and UNCTAD’s websites, respectively. 
4 At the Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005, Pascal Lamy showed up with a wand, 
stating that ”Trade is not a magic wand” (according to Stiglitz and Charlton 2006). 
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countries about WTO and help them modernise their trade institutions, but 
even improve their supply capacity. In the most optimistic version, AfT is 
a quick fix that secures that all countries benefit from  trade liberalisation. 
While Lamy and UNCTAD seem to partly disagree on trade liberalisation, 
they agree on the importance of aid for trade. As stated by Lamy (ibid.): 
“..we need to think more creatively about how trade, development and 
growth can fit together into a coherent whole. Aid for Trade is a key piece 
of that puzzle.” 
But if trade is not a magic wand, it is even less likely that AfT will be 
so. Hence there is a need for realism, and more analysis as an 
underpinning of future policy in the field. In this paper, we briefly review 
the development of AfT and then turn to the analysis of why and how AfT 
should be given. A core focus is on the concerns about trade: ”Trade may 
be good, but…” In general, the magnitude of AfT depends on the 
magnitude of the ”buts”. If the concerns about trade are great for many 
countries, trade liberalisation is less attractive and AfT is more important. 
If, on the other hand, trade is mostly good and does little harm, the 
argument for massive AfT is weaker. In the paper, we review some 
relevant literature and present some new evidence, as a platform to 
proceed to some tentative recommendations about AfT. In the analysis, we 
are not only interested in the need for AfT, but also which types of AfT 
that should be provided, and which countries should have it.  
Section 2 presents a brief chronology of AfT, with an overview of 
relevant institutions in Appendix A. Section 3 describes the AfT agenda in 
the DDA. In section 4, a brief review of the debate on trade and growth is 
presented. In sections 5 and 6, we present some new evidence concerning 
trade openness and development; with a special focus on finding out 
where AfT may be required. On this background, section 7 examines the 
country focus of AfT. Section 8 discusses AfT related to preference 
erosion and adjustment to trade liberalisation, and section 9 concludes. 
Appendix A briefly reviews the main institutions involved in AfT. Finally, 
a Statistical Appendix contains an examination of trade, income and 
growth, as an underpinning of some of the arguments made in the main 
text. 
 
2. Aid for Trade: A brief chronology 
 
The historical starting point for AfT was the establishment of ITC 
(International Trade Centre)5 in 1964. Since then, AfT has been part of the 
international aid agenda. Over time, the ITC developed its activity in the 
field which is called trade development in the current classification of 
AfT: export promotion and trade-related assistance to enterprises. Another 
early form of AfT was import promotion offices, which were established 
in some rich countries.  
A boost in AfT occurred after the completion of the Uruguay Round 
(UR). With the establishment of WTO and its so-called ”single 
undertaking” in 1995, a number of technically challenging sub-agreements 
                                                 
5 At the time, it was named International Trade Information Centre, and was established 
under GATT. Later, it became International Trade Centre UNCTAD/ GATT and then 
finally International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO. 
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Abbreviations 
In the AfT activity, a new ”tribe language” has
developed. So, for example, when we
mainstream TRTA into PRSP with DTIS
funded by IFTF, should it also be available for
OLIC, IDA only or ODA? Below are some
abbreviations relevant for Aid for Trade (AfT);
most of these are explained in more detail in
Appendix A or in the main text.   
► TRTA/CB: Trade-related technical 
assistance and capacity building 
► PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
► DTIS: Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies
► IF: Integrated Framework for Trade-Related 
Technical Assistance to Least-Developed 
Countries, with IFTF = IF Trust Fund, IFSC = 
IF Steering Committee 
► JITAP: Joint Integrated Technical 
Assistance Programme 
► TIM: Trade Integration Mechanism 
► OLIC: Other Low-Income Countries, i.e. 
non-LDC 
► IDA only: Countries eligible for 
concessional loans from IDA, i.e. mainly low-
income plus some lower middle income with 
debt problems 
► ODA: OECD-DAC list of countries entitled 
to Official Development Aid. 
became mandatory, also for developing countries. Combined with the 
strong expansion in WTO membership, this created a new demand for AfT 
related to trade policy and regulation; a second main category of AfT. For 
example, the SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) Agreement 
implied that developing countries had to improve their institutions for 
veterinary control and certification. Similarly, WTO and trade integration 
led to a need for upgrading of e.g. customs institutions and  intellectual 
property protection. In the aftermath of the UR, a greater awareness of the 
costs gradually developed. 
In the post-UR years, AfT was therefore stepped up in several 
institutions, including the newly established IF (Integrated Framework for 
Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries, 
established 1997) and JITAP (Joint Integrated Technical Assistance 
Programme, for Africa, established 1998). In 2001, IF was reformed and 
the WTO also expanded its AfT, including the establishment of a new 
trust fund for AfT donations.  
Taken together, ”trade development” and ”trade policy and regulation” 
constitute the category trade-related technical assistance and capacity 
building (TRTA/CB). From a modest level before the UR, such aid 
increased to 2.6 billion USD or 2.7% of all aid in 2004.6 Hence AfT has 
become a significant part of 
aid. Appendix A provides a 
brief overview of important 
institutions involved.  
TRTA/CB is AfT in the 
narrow sense; probably 
what most of us would 
perceive as AfT. As noted, 
however, it has been 
suggested that poor 
countries do not only need 
such aid, but also aid to 
develop the supply-side 
capacity. In OECD and 
World Bank statistics on 
AfT, therefore, figures on 
infrastructure (transport 
and storage, energy, 
communications) are 
added. This brings the AfT 
figure up to 15.5 billion 
USD or 16.6.% of 
worldwide aid. If 
”productive capacity 
building” is also included, 
the figure jumps to 22.8 
billion USD or ¼ of total 
                                                 
6 The figure is from OECD (2006a, 75).  
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aid.7 As noted by OECD (2006a), it is pretty arbitrary where the line is 
drawn. For example, education is important for productive capacity so 
why shouldn’t we include that as well? Re-naming aid will however not 
change the world very much. 
As a backdrop for the analysis of AfT, it is useful to observe some 
important features of the current activity:8 
► Almost 1/4 of AfT is directed towards the Least Developed Countries, 
and this share has increased in recent years. An important policy issue is 
whether the increased focus on LDCs is appropriate. Are the LDC’s the 
countries that need most AfT? Or maybe the LDCs need more 
”fundamental” aid while the more narrowly trade-related aid is more 
important for countries one step up the ladder, that have more to sell? Are 
the adjustment costs of trade liberalisation higher in LDCs compared to 
other developing countries? Is the focus on LDC just a way of limiting the 
costs, or is it warranted in economic terms? Given that LDCs represent 
less than 1% of world trade and only 2.3% of developing country exports9, 
these are important issues for the efficiency of AfT: It should be given 
where it is needed and effective.  
► A main focus of AfT since 2001 has been to integrate trade and AfT 
into national development plans and other aid. ”Mainstreaming” is the 
slogan. For LDCs, AfT has since 2001 been integrated into the Poverty-
Reduction Strategy Process of the World Bank. For this purpose, IF 
provides funding for so-called Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies 
(DTIS) which should lead to mainstreaming  of AfT into national 
development strategies.  
► The specialised AfT providers in IF, JITAP and WTO taken together 
provided in 2004 less than 1.5% of total TRTA/CB. Hence the largest part 
of AfT is provided through the regular activity of other multilateral 
institutions, or bilaterally. In Appendix A, an overview of the main actors 
is provided.   
► In spite of the focus on LDCs, the largest fraction of AfT (36%) is given 
to middle-income countries. This AfT is provided mainly by the non-
specialised aid agencies.  
► 85% of TRTA/CB is in the form of grants (OECD 2006a), while 
concessional loans are more common for infrastructure and productive 
capacity-building. 
► Almost half of AfT is given bilaterally (te Velde et al. 2006); not via 
multilateral organisation. For the EU, much AfT is provided from 
particular funding mechanisms with a regional focus. In 2004, 29% of 
EU’s AfT was funded by the EDF (European Development Fund), which 
is for  ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific).  Another 24% of EU’s 
AfT was from an aid programme for the Western Balkans (CARDS).  
                                                 
7 See OECD (2006a, 75). Earlier statistics were provided in e.g. OECD/WTO (2005).  
8 The figures are based on OECD (2006a), te Velde et al. (2006, 32) concerning the share 
of bilateral AfT, and IF (2006) regarding IFs budget. 
9 Based on Melchior (2005, 12). 
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► For the national pride, we may add that since 2002, Norway has 
provided more than 1/10 of the trust funds for AfT, and was the largerst 
individual donor to these funds.10 In the spirit of humility, it should 
nevertheless be recalled that these trust funds represent a small share of 
total AfT. 
Numerous evaluations of AfT have been undertaken. A useful 
overview is provided in OECD (2006b). Although a positive role for AfT 
is identified, several shortcomings are called into attention: 
- There has been unsystematic or incomplete needs assessment. 
- Project management and project governance structures have been 
weak. 
- Trade-related aid interventions have been fragmented, with insufficient 
synergies to broader aid. 
- Trade-related aid has been to weakly linked to poverty reduction 
objectives. 
- There has been insufficient donor coordination and complementarity at 
headquarters and field level. 
- Internal communication and expertise on trade-related matters in 
recipient countries have been inadequate. 
In several evaluations, a message is that recipient country ownership is too 
weak; mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation have been too limited; 
and even when clear priorities and recommendations have been made, 
funding and capacity for follow-up have been insufficient. 
For such reasons, there is currently a discussion on how the efficiency 
of AfT may be improved. Based on the analysis referred to above, OECD 
(2006b) recommends: 
- A better dialogue to ensure country ownership. 
- A better needs assessment through consultative diagnosis. 
- Explicit links to national poverty reduction strategies should be 
strengthened. 
- Better management and result-orientation. 
- Better donor coordination, harminisation and complementarity. 
- Improved internal communication and improved knowledge. 
As argued by Saner and Paez (2006, there is a considerable risk of failure 
to fulfil the expectations inherent in the current AfT process, and it is 
therefore important that reforms are implemented.   
In June-July 2006, two task forces presented reform proposals; on on 
an ”enhanced IF” and the other on AfT in general. The second one had 
been established by the WTO after the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, 
December 2005, when Ministers endorsed in principle the plans for an 
enhanced IF. 11 
The IF task force has suggested various institutional reforms that 
improve recipient country ownership, monitoring and evaluation, donor 
coordination and efficiency. In addition, a major scaling-up of budgets has 
been suggested. Based on past experience in fields such as customs reform 
and veterinary control facilities, i.e. costs related to the implementation of 
                                                 
10 This conclusion is based on the data provided by te Velde et al. (2006, 32). These data, 
in turn, are based on WTOs  AfT database.  
11 The task force recommendations are found in WTO (2006b, c).  
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particular WTO agreements, required funds for TRTA/CB have been 
estimated at 150 million USD per country.12  In the light of such estimates, 
the IF task force suggested that IF funds should be more than doubled to 
80 million USD per year over five years (WTO 2006c, 9). 
The Aid for Trade Task Force presented several proposals in order to 
increase the efficiency and coordination of AfT (WTO 2006b). It also 
supports the planned reforms of IF, and suggests that a similar process is 
established for non-LDC developing countries, focusing on “IDA only” 
countries.13 
  
3. AfT and the Doha Development Agenda 
 
Given the post-UR expansion of AfT, it was no surprise that AfT was 
mentioned in several parts of the Doha Declaration of 2001,  in which the 
WTO Ministers launched the current negotiation round, the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). In spite of this, it has never been accepted 
that AfT should be part of the ”single undertaking”. While some AfT is 
provided through WTOs regular budgets, the expansion has to come from 
voluntary contribution to the WTO trust fund. The task force on IF has 
suggested that the secretariat of the enhanced IF should be 
”administratively housed in the WTO Secretariat, with a strong firewall 
around it” (WTO 2006c, 19). Hence AfT is partly inside and partly outside 
the WTO.  
In the WTO and other institutions dealing with AfT, there is broad 
agreement about the usefulness of  TRTA/CB as well as the need to 
increase funding and to make such aid more efficient. There are however 
various conflicts about AfT that have emerged: 
A first issue is about the country coverage of AfT. The IMF and the 
World Bank, plus some developing countries, have advocated that the 
enhanced IF should be extended from LDCs to other low-income 
developing countries (see e.g. IMF/World Bank 2006, 9). The IF task 
force rejected this proposal.14 An issue is therefore: Is this exclusive focus 
on LDCs warranted? As noted, the Aid for Trade Task Force (WTO 
2006b) suggests a parallel proces for non-LDC countries. 
A second issue is whether AfT should cover adjustment costs due to 
WTO liberalisation. While AfT currently covers costs of implementation, 
there is disagreement about adjustment costs. Examples of such costs are: 
- Losses due to preference erosion: ACP and LDC have asked for 
compensation when their trade preferences are eroded, and the issue of 
preference erosion has been an obstacle in the NAMA (Non-
Agricultural Market Access) of the DDA. AfT is one possible form of 
compensation for preference erosion. 
                                                 
12 According to OECD (2006a), the figure of 150 million is likely on the high side. It is 
based on extrapolations undertaken by Finger and Schuler (2000). 
13 IDA refers to the classification of the International Development Association (see 
www.worldbank.org/ida). ”IDA only” is a list of countries qualified for interest-free 
loans and grants from this affiliate of the World Bank. There are currently 81 such 
countries; of which a few have hardened terms. 
14 Establishing parallel arrangements for non-LDCs is however still on the agenda. 
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- For some poor countries, tariffs make up a large part of public 
revenue, and tariff cuts may erode public funding. AfT has been 
suggested as a remedy. 
While there is agreement about the existence of these problems, there is 
yet no agreement about whether and to what extent AfT should be scaled 
up to account for adjustment costs of this kind. 
Third, it has been suggested that AfT should not only address specific 
costs related to trade agreements, but it should improve the supply 
capacity of poor countries. According to Stiglitz and Charlton (2006, 27), 
”a key feature of an expanded aid for trade agenda should be to promote 
investments in new productive capacity”. If aid is provided for this as well 
as related to adjustment costs, it will, according to the authors, ”offer the 
possibility that, instead of developing countries being worse off – as so 
many were as a result of the last round of trade negotiations – they will 
actually be better off. It offers the possibility of a trade agreement that will 
actually result not only in more imports and job losses in developing 
countries, but more exports and job creation” (ibid., 31) Hence the 
proposal is based on a rather pessimistic analysis of trade liberalisation: 
Unless trade liberalisation is supplemented with heavy amounts of AfT, 
developing countries will lose.   
AfT for supply-side development is generally on the lists of AfT 
priorities already, but is it nut fully clear what it means in practice, beyond 
adding it to the AfT statistics. As noted by OECD (2006a), a key isssue 
with respect to AfT is where to draw the line: Should AfT be limited to the 
narrow TRTA/CB, or widened to address adjustment costs as well as 
production-capacity building? The answer to this question largely rests on 
the scope of the problem: Does freer trade lead to large costs and losses, or 
only small ones? Are tariff revenue losses a modest or a severe problem? 
Will developing countries generally lose from the DDA unless it is 
accompanied with massive AfT, or will they generally gain? In the search 
for a new consensus, this is a rhetorical and political battleground.  
 
4. Trade and growth: The Post-Washington confusion 
 
Given that policies related to AfT crucially depends on the perceptions 
about how good or bad trade is, we shall – as a platform for the later 
analysis – summarise some of the current literature in the field, before 
presenting some tentative new evidence.  
In the World Development Report 1987 (World Bank 1987), one of 
the pillars of the Washington consensus, growth through industrialisation 
and trade was a major message. For some developing countries, especially 
in Asia, this has indeed materialised. After the UR, there has been a surge 
in manufacturing exports from developing countries. During 1996-2004, 
the share of low- and middle-income countries in world exports of 
manufacturing grew from 22 to 31%. 4% of the 9% increase was due to 
China.15 The rising share is equivalent to an export increase in 2004 prices 
of more than 700 billion USD. A change of this magnitude in only 8 years 
                                                 
15 Own calculations based on COMTRADE data. The WTO ”NAMA” definition of 
manufactured goods is applied  (NAMA=Non-Agricultural Market Access). 
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is dramatic. It is likely that trade liberalisation, e.g. tariff cuts and the 
dismantling of the  MFA (the ”Multifibre Agreement”, for textiles and 
clothing), contributed to this growth. The causality may be complex and it 
may be that growth drives trade rather than the opposite, or even that both 
are driven by other factors.  What is absolutely sure, however, is that 
industrialisation and growth in developing countries have been core 
features of the world economy also during the last decade.  
It is nevertheless well-known that this success does not apply to all 
developing countries. Hence some countries that “did the right things” 
according to the Washington consensus, faced stagnation rather than 
growth. This heterogeneity of outcomes is the main underlying reason 
why there is no consensus in the research literature about how trade 
liberalisation and growth are related.16 Some research in the 1990s  
seemed to confirm that trade liberalisation promotes growth, but then 
came the critique of Rodrigues and Rodrik (1999); maintaining that the 
results were based on variables that poorly reflected trade liberalisation. 
Some later research, see e.g. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) have added to 
the “pro-trade” literature suggesting that trade liberalisation promotes 
growth. According to Rodrigues (2006), however, the results of Wacziarg 
and Welch are subject to the same criticisms as earlier attempts, so the 
jury is still out.  
It is important to recall that the inconclusive state of this  literature 
relates to the question an trade liberalisation and growth, and not the 
relationship between trade and growth. On trade and income levels, recent 
research (Nogues and Siscart 2005) suggests that there is a strong and 
positive relationship: More trade corresponds with higher income. It 
should also be recalled that inconclusiveness on the trade liberalisation/ 
growth link does not imply that any result to the opposite effect has been 
found. So when Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) at least seem to suggest (see 
quotation above) that trade liberalisation has been generally bad for 
developing countries, there is no research consensus about this.  
Why, then, has a relationship between trade liberalisation and growth 
not been confirmed by research? One possibility is of course that such a 
relationship actually does not exist. Another is that empirical research in 
the field is still limited, and based on relatively crude measures of trade 
policy. For example, there is to our knowledge still no study that use 
accurate time-series data on tariffs in such work. Such data have recently 
become more easily available, and new research using better data may 
hopefully add to our knowledge. Another issue is that empirical work has 
not fully reflected developments in theory. For example, in the empirical 
literature, a distinction has not been properly made between one’s own 
liberalisation and the liberalisation of others: While the latter (better 
market access) is unambiguously positive in virtually all economic 
models,  there are situations where a country may gain from its own 
protection. So even if joint trade liberalisation is good, the impact of own 
liberalisation may be mixed in some of the new trade theories.  
Another aspect of importance is the great amount of heterogeneity 
across countries. Several contributions confirm that there are good as well 
                                                 
16 For a survey on trade and growth, see Maurseth (2005). 
10      Arne Melchior 
  
as bad cases (see e.g. Wacziarg and Welch 2003, Rodrigues 2006). When 
these are stacked together in growth regressions, the average result – 
which the regression analysts look for – becomes blurred. There is 
probably not one single model that can capture all the different stories 
simultaneously. For such reasons, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2001) have 
argued that regression analysis is not an appropriate method for examining 
the complex interactions between trade liberalisation and growth.  
From development economics as well as modern economic theory, it is 
in fact not surprising that the relationship between openness and growth 
may be ambiguous. Even if trade liberalisation generally leads to welfare 
gains, this may not be equally distributed, and there may be losers, both 
within and across countries.17 In trade models with scale economies and 
imperfect competition, scale-based industries tend to cluster in countries 
with better market access. In such models, or models with industry-wide 
externalities,18 it is frequently the case that improved market access is 
always good, but the impact of own liberalisation may be ambiguous. 
When technology levels differ across countries and knowledge does not 
spread easily across borders, trade liberalisation may sometimes be to the 
advantage of the technologically superior nations (see e.g. Grossman and 
Helpman 1995). There may also be cases where trade liberalisation leads 
to a one-off increase in income while the long-run growth rate is 
unaffected. Hence empirically as well as theoretically, it is important to be 
aware of the distinction between level and growth effects.  
   
5. Good trades and bad trades: Some new evidence 
 
So we are left in the post-Washington confusion: We are no longer certain 
about to what extent trade is good or bad. We may address the critique by 
political rhetorics: ”Trade alone is not sufficient for growth; we need 
institutions, investments and so on.” But such wordings, even if they ar 
basically true, will not resolve the problem of perception. Unless we 
address it, many NGOs and developing countries may gang up in 
discontent. We may put money into AfT to add some harmony, but we 
will have no post-Washington consensus.  
For such reasons, we shall make an attempt to shed some new light on 
the basic issue: how good is trade? In the context of AfT, our primary 
objective will not be to find new results on the average effect of openness, 
but we are interested in the heterogeneity of outcomes: Since AfT is for 
the ”problems with trade”, we want to track countries where increased 
trade has not contributed to development. If it is true that trade does not 
work in some cases; it is for policy purposes urgent to know the scale of 
the problem: Is it rare and accidental, or a widespread fault of the trade 
system? If the latter is true, it might even be appropriate to halt trade 
liberalisation. But if the gains from trade liberalisation far outweigh the 
problems, we should argue against the sceptics.  
                                                 
17 For a survey, see e.g. Darity and Davis (2005). 
18 Such scale economies at the industry level imply that productivuty increases with the 
production volume, and may result from e.g. learning-by-doing, labour market pooling, 
vertical linkages between input and final goods producers, and technology spillovers 
between firms.  
                                                                   Aid for Trade and the Post-Washington Confusion     11  
  
We address this issue by analysing the relationship between real 
income per capita on one side, and trade openness on the other. In a 
Statistical Appendix, an analysis of these issues is provided, using data 
covering 1975-2002 for 165 countries.  
In the Statistical Appendix, we show that openness as well as the trade 
balance affects income per capita; trade is generally not balanced and the 
surplus countries tend to have higher income levels. Hence there is an 
impact of openness, but also competetiveness, on the income level. If we 
use exports/GDP as a measure of openness, the results will partly reflect 
the competitiveness effect, which is not due to openness per se, but better 
technology and skills, or lower costs. We therefore use imports/GDP as a 
measure of openness. We are interested in studying the impact of openness 
as such, and not the impact of increased competitiveness.  
Since the imports/GDP ratio is more directly affected by a country’s 
own trade liberalisation, this variable is also more relevant for the 
concerns related to trade liberalisation. The imports/GDP ratio is however 
affected not only by e.g. tariffs or other government-determined trade 
costs but also other aspects such as country size (large countries are more 
closed), geographical location (e.g. landlocked countries face higher trade 
costs  and therefore trade less) and others. It is therefore a measure of 
openness, and not trade policy; although it is influenced by trade policy.19  
In the following analysis, imports of services are included, so our 
measure of openness in imports of goods and services as a % of GDP. As 
to the income level variable, we use GDP per capita, PPP (constant 
international $). This is a  measure of real income; comparable across 
countries since PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) data are used. PPP implies 
that figures are adjusted for cross-country differences in price levels. For 
both variables, the data source is the World Bank Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2004). With 28 years and 106-165 countries (varying across 
years), we have a dataset with more than 4000 observations. This dataset 
has two dimensions; the cross-section dimension (comparing different 
countries at each point in time) and the dime-series dimension. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to undertake an in-depth 
examination of the cross-country variation in openness and income, the 
results in the Appendix suggest that there is a strong and stable 
relationship: More openness corresponds to higher income per capita. 
These tentative results are in line with the findings of e.g. Noguer and 
Siscart (2005), who found find that a 1% increase in openness corresponds 
to approximately 1% increase in GDP per capita. 
Turning to the time-series variation in the data, we have already noted 
the inconclusive state of the research literature on trade and growth. We 
do not have the ambition here to provide the final answer; in the context of 
AfT we are in fact more interested in the heterogeneity across countries 
than the average effect: How many and which countries have a ”problem 
with trade”, and can it be remedied by AfT? 
                                                 
19 Rodrigues and Rodrik (1999) maintain that studies of openness and growth have little 
to say about trade policy and growth. While we agree that the distinction is important, we 
believe that a focus on openness is appropriate in the context of AfT, and furthermore 
that studies of openness and growth are relevant also for trade policy considerations.    
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For the purpose of this analysis, we make a useful observation: Even if 
the time-series correlation between the two variables (income level and 
openness) is weak for the whole sample of countries, there is frequently a 
very robust correlation at the individual country level. As an illustration, 
Diagrams 1a and 1b show two examples:  
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Diagram 1: Income vs. openness in Botswana and Chile. 
 
In the case of Botwana there is a clear negative correlation so that more 
openness corresponds with lower income. In the case of Chile, however, 
the reverse is true. Now if we mix the two datasets, this clarity is lost and 
that is why the correspondence is weak in the pooled dataset. For this 
reason, we shall undertake the analysis in a roundabout two-step fashion: 
We first derive how the correlation is at the individual country level, and 
then examine what determines the variation across countries in the results 
we obtain. 
How many countries are like Chile, and how many are like Botswana? 
In order to provide an answer, we use statistical methods (regression 
analysis, see Appendix) to put a number on each country, mostly between 
–2 and +2. For example, we obtain –1.75 for Botwana and 1.65 for Chile. 
We call these number openness-income elasticities since they measure 
how much a 1% change in openness affects income per capita. For 
example, if the elasticity is +2 and openness increases from 10 to 15%, i.e. 
by 50%, income per capita will be doubled.  
The measurement of these elasticities is undertaken for each country 
individually, using only the time-series variation in the data. Even if we do 
not explicitly consider growth rates, we examine how changes in openness 
are related to changes in income, which is indeed economic growth. The 
distinction between levels and changes/growth is important since the 
results may differ, depending on how the question is asked. Table 1 
illustrates the options: 
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Table 1: Levels versus changes 
Income per capita 
 Level, at some 
point in time 
Change over 
time (growth) 
Level, at some 
point in time 
(1)  
Pure cross-section 
(2) 
Mixed Openness Change over 
time 
(3) 
Mixed 
(4)  
Pure time-series 
 
In the first calculations referred to above, we considered the pure cross-
section variation – option (1): How does openness affect the income level 
when we compare countries in a given year? In the calculation of income-
openness elasticities, we now change to option (4) – by using only the 
time-series variation. All four options are however possible. In the 
literature on trace and growth, some authors have asked: Do open 
countries grow faster - option (2)? Version (3) is more rare, but we could 
imaging studies of trade policy asking e.g. ”Are rich countries more 
liberal?” – i.e.  how does the income level affect changes in openness. 
Observe that we use statistical (regression) analysis as a descriptive 
device and make no statements here about causality. It may be that 
economic growth leads to more trade and not vice versa; or it may be that 
both variables are affected by other variables. It is evident that any time 
trend in the two variables will make them correlated. We use these 
correlations in order to describe the data; we make at this stage no 
statements about the mechanism behind.  
In cases such as Botswana and Chile, whare data points are close to a 
line, there is a statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables. To what extent is this true also for other countries? We find that 
2/3 of the estimates are statistically significant (and different from zero), 
while for 34% of the countries, there is no stastically significant 
relationship  (i.e. the elasticity is not different from zero with statistical 
certainty). Among the statistically significant cases, there are twice as 
many positive as negative cases. Hence there is more frequently a positive 
relationship between trade opening and economic growth.20 
Diagram 2 shows the frequency distribution of values, including the 
non-significant elasticities (which are generally close to zero).  
 
                                                 
20 Observe that a given correlation is not necessarily synonymous with a particular trend 
over time. In most cases, a positive correlation corresponds to a positive change over 
time: Income as well as openness increases. A positive correlation may however also 
occur if e.g. protectionism (=less openness) leads to a fall i income. Correspondingly, a 
negative correlation may be present even in cases with strong economic growth, if a 
falling share of GDP is imported. As we shall see, cases of both types are present. 
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Diagram 2: The elasticity of income with respect to openness: Frequency 
distribution for 165 countries
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Hence there are not so many large positive or negative values; the bulk of 
the countries are in the middle. The centre of the distribution is slightly 
above zero; the simple mean of the elasticities is 0.14. Hence on average, 
there there is a modest positive relationship between openness and income 
level. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the 50 top and bottom estimates, 
including levels of significance. 
A negative openness-income elasticity is not alone a sufficient 
indicator to tell that a country has a ”problem with trade”.  For example, 
the imports/GDP ratio may decline in countries wih high growth, if GDP 
per capita increases faster than imports. An illustration is Norway, where 
oil revenues have boosted GDP faster than imports; so the elasticity 
becomes negative. A similar case is in fact Botswana; probably influenced 
by resource-based export growth (diamonds). Given that negative 
elasticities also occur for high-growth countries, we add a second criterion 
in order to capture in a better way the ”problems with trade”: We divide 
countries acording to whether economic growth in the period was below 
or above the median.  The median annual growth rate was 1.19%, 
corresponding to 38% growth in income per capita over the entire 1975-
2002 period. Using this second criterion, we divide the 165 countries into 
five groups, as shown in table 2: 
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Table 2: Classification of countries according to economic growth and 
the openness-income elasticity 
Keyword Brief description Openness-income elasticity 
Economic 
growth rate 
Negative Negative elasticity, low growth 
Negative,  
statistcally significant Below median
Negative+ Negative elasticity, high growth 
Negative,  
statistcally significant Above median
Neutral Unclear openness-income relationship 
Not significantly 
different from zero Any 
Positive─ Positive elasticity, low growth 
Positive,  
statistcally significant Below median
Positive Positive elasticity, high growth 
Positive,  
statistcally significant Above median
 
Hence from the countries with significantly negative elasticities, we split 
out cases such as Norway and Botswana, where growth has been high for 
particular reasons (oil, diamonds etc.). Similarly, we split out grey-area 
cases with a positive elasticity but low growth. In this way, we obtain 
”Negative” and ”Positive” categories that better address the issues of 
interest. 
Reverting to our level-change taxonomy, we have now used the time-
series information for each country in order to to classify them as above. 
In our two-step analysis, we now proceed to a cross-section analysis of 
these results: What are the characteristics of the various groups, and what 
determines whether we have a negative or positive outcome?  
The chosen classification is admittedly crude and a more extensive 
analysis could be made to improve its accuracy. For example, we have 
treated the period 1975-2002 as one, although the trend could have 
changed over time for individual countries. Furthermore, more analysis is 
needed in order to pin down the causality between trade and development. 
We nevertheless believe that this classification serves our purpose here, 
which is to shed some light on the heterogeneity of outcomes with respect 
to trade and growth, and the proportion of countries where there has not 
been a positive trade-growth relationship. The classification pins down 
where increased trade openness, due to trade liberalisation or  other 
reasons, is adversely related to economic growth. The fear that poor 
countries may lose from increased trade openness has frequently been 
raised by critics related to the current WTO  negotiations, and – as 
illustrated above – it has also provided an argument for AfT. It could also 
be argued that AfT should be provided not only to the bad cases, but also 
to the neutral  or grey-area countries where increased trade openness has 
not been accompanied by growth. The approximate magnitude of this 
group will also be evident from our results. 
Table 3 and Diagram 3 show the distribution of countries according to 
the classification above.  In Table 3, the upper half shows absolute 
numbers, and the lower half the percentage distribution. The diagram 
shows the percentage distribution. 
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Table 3: The openness-income relationship: 
Distribution for different variables/ country groups 
Variable or  
country group 
Total in 
sample Negative Negative+ Neutral Positive- Positive 
Absolute figures (=number, except world GDP= billion $, world population=millions) 
Economic size 
World GDP (PPP) 47760 481 4396 7159 2288 33437 
World Population 5004 128 309 918 358 3290 
WTO membership 
WTO members  135 10 17 46 22 40 
Non-WTO  30 5 3 10 5 7 
Country/ income groups 
All countries  165 15 20 56 27 47 
Rich 34 3 6 6 1 18 
Developing  130 12 14 50 26 28 
IDA only 70 10 7 28 13 12 
Low income 53 8 3 22 11 9 
Least developed  40 5 2 17 7 9 
% of total 
Variable or  
country group 
Total in 
sample Negative Negative+ Neutral Positive- Positive 
Economic size 
World GDP (PPP) 100 1.0 9.2 15.0 4.8 70.0 
World Population 100 2.6 6.2 18.4 7.2 65.7 
WTO membership 
WTO members  100 7.4 12.6 34.1 16.3 29.6 
Non-WTO  100 16.7 10.0 33.3 16.7 23.3 
Country/ income groups 
All countries  100 9.1 12.1 33.9 16.4 28.5 
Rich 100 8.8 17.6 17.6 2.9 52.9 
Developing  100 9.2 10.8 38.5 20.0 21.5 
IDA only 100 14.3 10.0 40.0 18.6 17.1 
Low income 100 15.1 5.7 41.5 20.8 17.0 
Least developed  100 12.5 5.0 42.5 17.5 22.5 
Note: The classification of country groups follows Melchior (2005); for details see  
http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/685.pdf. 
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Diagram 3: The trade-growth relationship: Distribution for 
various country groups/ variables
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To the far left we observe the ”countries in the red” in our context (low 
growth, negative relationship between openness and income) and to the far 
right we have the ”success stories” (high growth, positive openness-
income relationship). 
In terms of economic size, measured by GDP or population, it is 
evident that the positive outcomes far outweigh the negative: The Negative 
group represents a modest 1.0% of world GDP, and 2.6% of the world 
population. The Positive group, on the other hand, accounts for 66% of 
world population and 70% of world GDP.  
Since there are several small countries in the Negative group, the 
proportions are considerably changed if we count countries. Now the 
proportion of Negative increases to 9%, while Positive shrinks to 28%.  
The number of countries in the middle, with mixed or ambiguous 
outcomes, now represents 62%.  
Since the majority of countries are WTO members, the distribution for 
WTO members is close to the distribution for all countries. For non-
members of WTO, however, the outcome is more frequently negative (5 
countries out of 30, i.e. 1/6 of the cases). 
A main result here is that the number of negative outcomes is limited, 
but there is a sizeable group in the middle where a virtuous trade-growth 
relationship is missing. Even if the Positive group dominates in terms of 
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economic weight, the non-positive outcomes dominate when we count the 
number of countries. In political settings with one country, one vote, it 
will be no surprise if the support for trade liberalisation is lukewarm.  
For statistical purposes, the results show the importance of weighting: 
With each country countring equally, the negative or intermediate 
outcomes dominate. If we weight by population or country size, on the 
other hand, the outcome is dramatically changed. In the growth regression 
literature, countries are normally given equal weights so that the numerous 
small countries with a less favourable outcome have a large impact. This 
contributes to explaining the inconclusive state of the growth regression 
literature.   
The distribution of good and bad trade-growth outcomes, as shown in 
the results above, corresponds closely to the world income distribution and 
its development over the last decades. Also in this case, the overall 
assessment crucially depends on weighting or not:  
- There is a considerable list of countries with a low income per capita 
and low growth, but if we weight by population, this groups shrinks to 
less than 10% of the total (Melchior 2001).  
- If countries are weighted by their populations, there has been income 
convergence in the world economy over the last decades; see e.g. 
Melchior (2001) or Sala-i-Martin (2006).21 If all countries count 
equally, however, the opposite conclusion obtains.  
As illustrated above, the importance of weigthing also applies to trade: If 
trade is good for China and India, with a combined population of 2.4 
billions in 2004, and bad for Rwanda and Tadjikistan, with a combined 
population of 15 millions, should we then conclude that trade is on 
average not positive? While regression analysis follows the one country, 
one vote approach, our analysis here suggests that trade is indeed positive 
for a large part of the world economy as well as the world population.22  
 
6. What explains the ”bad trades”? 
 
Hence we have found that there is a negative association between trade 
openness and income for some countries, and a positive association for 
others. Are the failures or successes related to particular aspects of trade or 
trade institutions, or are they just an expression of general development 
outcomes? The more trade-specific they are; the more they provide an 
argument for AfT. We shall therfore look into what determines the 
outcomes according to our classification in the preceding section. This 
analysis is indeed a giant task, and we limit ourselves to a tentative 
assessment.  
                                                 
21 If within-country inequality is added, the trend is modified but not changed. There are 
several papers supporting this, see e.g. Schultz (1998). Milanovic (2002) obtains another 
conclusion for the period 1988-1993. There is some uncertainty about  the quality of the 
income data used for these calculations (or their PPP adjustment, see Dowrick and Akmal 
2005), but that is another matter.  
22 For this reason, regression analysis should not be used for descriptive purposes unless 
the units of observation are equal in some sense. Regression may however be used for 
causal analysis without weighting. 
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The basic answer to our question above is that the negative cases 
observed in the preceding analysis are related to general problems of 
economic development and growth, and not problems that are specifically 
related to trade. This has the implication that if AfT is to address the 
supply-side issues, it should be done jointly with aid for economic 
development in general. 
We obtain this conclusions by studying the factors that determine the 
position of countries in our classification, and compare this to the results 
from research on trade and growth. We basically find that the variables 
that produce a positive trade-growth relationship are also the variables that 
drive growth. Details of this analysis are found in the Statistical Appendix, 
Section 3. 
Some variables have an unambiguous impact on the trade-growth 
relationship: Developed capital markets, good institutions and a high 
technology level are positive aspects. Being landlocked is negative. Large 
countries do better. Specialisation also matters: High employment in 
manufacturing and services, and little in agriculture, is positive, as well as 
a high share of manufacturing in exports. 
Some variables have a significant but less clear-cut impact. For 
example, military conflict precludes a positive outcome, but does not 
necessarily put you on the negative list. High tariffs are similar; they 
preclude a positive outcome but do not necessarily create a very negative 
trade-growth relationship. Health and education are necessary for a 
positive outcome, but even with good health and education, you can be 
among the less fortunate. The intuition is that for these variables, there is 
considerable variation among the negative cases, so the impact is more 
ambiguous.  
From the literature on trade and growth, it is well known that several 
factors affect growth, but causality analysis is extremely difficult since 
many variables are correlated (see e.g. Dollar and Kraay 2003). In this 
study, the ambition is not to sort out causality. For our purpose here, it is 
sufficient to note that our results are in line with the growth literature, and 
the trade and growth literature; in the sense that the determinants of 
growth are generally the same as the determinants of whether the 
openness-income relationship is positive or negative. In his survey of the 
trade and growth literature, Winters (2004) e.g. mention corruption, 
inflation, investment policy, institutions and education as important 
aspects. We have checked all these except for inflation, and found support. 
For education, the cross-country evidence from growth research is more 
mixed, and it is in line with this that we have education on our ”list B”. 
Similarly, the relationship between conflict and growth is complex (on 
wars and trade, see e.g. contributions in Schneider et al. 2003). The 
position of tariffs in this second group indicates that trade liberalisation is 
neecessary but not sufficient in order to obtain a virtuous trade-growth 
relationship. This is also in line with earlier contributions (see e.g. Winters 
2004).   
Our tentative result therefore suggest that the ”problems with trade” 
are basically the problems of growth. Hence there is no quick fix, since 
most of the characteristics that are relevant, are of a long-term nature and 
can hardly be remedied over night. Addressing supply-side problems is 
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therefore not only trade-related, but related to the broader agenda of aid 
for economic development.   
There are however some more trade-related drivers of growth: For 
example, we find that landlocked countries are over-represented in the 
negative group. In a recent study of Africa’s exports, Clarke (2005) also 
found support concerning the role of being landlocked. More generally, 
Redding and Venables (2003) found that poor external geography, poor 
internal geography, and poor institutional quality contributed 
approximately equally to explaining the dismal export performance of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Aid for infrastructure development is more trade-
related than e.g. schools and hospitals, so the ”problems with trade” 
provide an argument for a high level of support for infrastructure 
development.  
In terms of policy, our conclusions indicate that AfT in order to 
address supply-side issues should be coordinated with aid in general. 
Hence it underlines the need to ”mainstream” AfT into national 
development strategies, and coordinate with other aid, as suggested by the 
AfT task force as well as other studies. 
 
7. Aid for trade and country selection: Is the focus on LDCs warranted?   
 
In the development of AfT so far,  it has been assumed that the LDCs are 
the countries in most need of AfT. It is therefore of interest to use our 
results to check whether this is the case. From Diagram 3, it is evident that 
the LDCs have relatively more negative outcomes than the overall sample, 
but that is even more true for the low-income, IDA only and non-WTO 
groups. This creates some doubt as to whether it is really true that the 
LDCs are the most needy in terms of AfT. 
As a further check, let us therefore look closer at the countries at the 
bottom end. Since our Negative category contains only 15 countries out of 
the 165, we use a somewhat wider selection by picking countries with 
below-median growth and an openness-income elasticity below –0.10. In 
this way, we obtain a group of 30 countries. In the Statistical Appendix, 
Table S5, these are listed, with data on some of their properties.23 How 
many of the 30 ”most needy” according to our classification are LDCs? 
Table 4 sums up some of the properties of these 30 countries.  
  
                                                 
23 It should be emphasized that in the classification used here, it is to some extent 
arbitrary where the border lines are drawn. For policies toward individual countries, more 
specific analysis would be required. The purpose here is to provide some broad 
guidelines, and it is evident that the classification of individual countries could change if 
the criteria were modified.  
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Table 4: Characteristics of 30 countries with low growth and a 
negative income-openness elasticity 
Country group24 Number (out of 30) 
Least developed  10 
Least-developed + low-income 16 
IDA only 19 
Former Soviet Union 12 
Not WTO member 7 
Landlocked 9 
Severely indebted 8 
Small island developing state (definition 1) 4 
Small island developing state (definition 2) 3 
High 3 
Upper middle 3 
Lower middle 10 Income group 
Low 14 
  
Hence while the low and lower middle income countries are in a clear 
majority, only 1/3 of these countries are LDCs. The country group that 
captures the highest fraction, is ”IDA only” which covers 19 of the 30. If 
the 30 countries are ranked by income level, the IDA list perfectly 
matches the lower part of the table. Observe that 12 FSU republics are on 
the list. These are not LDCs, but six of them are on the IDA list. Six of the 
FSU countries (plus Vanuatu) are not yet WTO members.  
In the Aid for Trade context, there has been a focus on the poorest 
countries: The IF programme has included only the Least Developed 
countries. Hence to the extent that our list properly captures some of the 
”problems with trade”, our results suggest that a focus on LDCs is 
inaccurate in terms of targeting; a better choice would be to give AfT to 
IDA countries. Covering low-income would also be an improvement. Aid 
for WTO accession could also cover many of the non-WTO cases. Hence 
our results provide an argument for increasing AfT for WTO-acceding 
countries. These arguments are not to say that LDCs do not need aid; what 
we are saying is that with respect to AfT, the LDC group is not the best 
possible focus.  
Hence even in order to reach the most needy of AfT, a focus beyond 
the LDCs may be required. This is even more true for the next step on the 
ladder; the countries with an ambiguous trade-growth relationship. This 
group is harder to classify, but from Diagram 3 it is evident that the white 
intermediate segments constitute a large number of developing countries 
in general. This is an argument for  providing AfT to a broad group of 
developing countries. Scaling such aid according to income levels is one 
option. 
In the recent Geneva-based process, there was no agreement to expand 
the IF to non-LDCs. The IF Task Force, however, concluded that ”the IF 
should remain exclusively for the LDCs, as their needs are particularly 
                                                 
24 For details on the definition of country groups, see Melchior (2005). 
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acute, although a similar mechanism could be of use in other countries” 
(WTO 2006c, 7). In spite of the conclusion, there is an opening for 
creating a similar mechanism for non-LDCs. Our results indicate that such 
an additional facility should be created. Alternatively, support for non-
LDCs could be scaled up via other existing channels. As noted earlier, a 
large share of AfT is given to non-LDCs in the current situation. The 
results above suggest that there should not be a further drift towards an 
exclusive LDC focus, but AfT for non-LDCs is also important.  
The Aid for Trade Task Force (WTO 2006b, 4) has suggested to 
”Explore the necessity of establishing a similar, but seperately funded, in-
country-process for non-LDCs ”International Development Assistance 
(IDA)-only” countries, if such mechanisms do not already exist or can be 
improved upon.” The analysis above provides support for this aim; 
although we do not assess what is the best institutional solution. There is 
the down-side that an ”IF-II” may create unneccessary duplication and 
bureaucracy, so a wider IF seems as a better solution. If that is politically 
impossible, other options have to be examined. 
 
8. AfT and adjustment costs 
 
So far, we have discussed two forms of AfT; 
- ”type 1” which is Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity-
Building, and 
- ”type 2” which is supply-side AfT.  
We have argued that ”type 1” should be expanded through particular AfT 
institutions, and that there is also a need for ”type 2” but that is mostly the 
same as aid for economic development in general. Hence while there may 
also be good arguments for more aid if ”type 2”, it is less clear that 
specific new institutions have to be created. 
A third type of AfT are adjustment costs related to trade liberalisation. 
For completeness we shall also discuss that briefly; although a 
considerable literature exists in this field and we do not have the ambition 
to add much here. Such ”type 3” AfT is conceptually very distinct from 
the two former because it is related to particular effects of liberalisation, 
that apply to particular countries that do not necessarily fit into the 
classification schemes we have made so far. In the WTO, there is a 
presedence from the Uruguay Round, where net food-importing 
developing countries were given promises of aid in case they were 
adversely affected by agricultural trade liberalisation. 
With respect to losses from preference erosion, Hoekman and Prowse 
(2005) argues that AfT should be given in order to compensate for 
preference erosion (see also Kleen and Page 2005). Their argument is 
partly one of political economy (compensating losers), and partly that AfT 
related to preference erosion should be part of a broader AfT agenda 
including supply-side measures. As noted by Stiglitz and Charlton (2006), 
however, AfT linked to preference erosion implies a focus on a few 
particular countries that leaves out many of the needy.  
It is important to observe that preference erosion is not a ”problem 
with trade” in the sense we have defined it: Some of the countries that are 
most severely affected by preference erosion, are among the most 
                                                                   Aid for Trade and the Post-Washington Confusion     23  
  
”successful” according to our measures. For example, Mauritius has a 
trade-income elasticity of 1.63, and average growth in income per capita at 
4.34% annually over 20 years. As an ACP country, Mauritius has had 
better access to the EU market than ordinary developing countries.  But 
Mauritius is affected by preference erosion for sugar, textiles and clothing 
and is on top of some of the lists that have been made on such losses (see 
e.g. Low et al. 2005, 2006, Alexandraki et al. 2004, Milner et al. 2004, 
Grynberg et al 2004).  
While some developing countries may be significantly affected by 
preference erosion, the overall messages are that  
- the total gains for developing countries far outweigh the potential 
losses 
- losses are likely for a limited number of countries 
- the greatest problems are related to EUs agricultural regime, e.g. sugar. 
Further, it should be recalled that preference erosion for rich countries is 
an important aspect that adds to the gains for developing countries. For 
example, there has been a large intra-European preferential margin for 
clothing, and the erosion through tariff reduction and the elimination of 
quotas implies that developing countries capture much larger shares of the 
European clothing market (Melchior 2006). LDC and ACP constitute, in 
economic terms, just a small fraction of the developing countries. 
Preference erosion is not a ”problem with trade” but a problem of selective 
market access for only some, while other developing countries are 
excluded. This is an unsolidaric regime, and it has even been argued that 
such preferences should be considered as a temporary advantage that does 
not require compensation. Another issue is who should compensate: 
Should such AfT be multilateral or bilateral? The EU is already well on its 
way implementing regimes that compensate for the changes in the banana 
and sugar regimes (te Velde et al. 2006). 
Preference erosion has been addressed in a number of other 
contributions and we do not undertake extensive new analysis here. The 
facts are now relatively clear, and it is mainly a political-economy and 
institutional issue whether and how such compensation should be given. 
Our previous analysis suggests that too much focus on preference erosion 
leads to a focus on countries that are not among the most ”needy” in terms 
of supply-side limitations. We do not here argue against AfT for 
preference erosion, we suggest it should be transitional. There are also 
plausible arguments for delegating the responsibility for such AfT, or at 
least much of it, to the countries that provided the preferential market 
access. 
A second type of AfT for adjustment is related to the elimination of 
tax revenue. The correlations in Appendix Table A3 suggest that if import 
duties have a high share of tax revenue, countries do not belong to the 
success group. Furthermore, reductions in this share over time promotes a 
better outcome (see page 49). Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) argue in favour 
of AfT related to tax reform. According to Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), 
revenue losses due to tariff reduction is particularly a problem for low-
income countries. The IMF currently has a number of activities related to 
tax reform and sees this as an important issue, but has nevertheless argued 
against a separate ”adjustment funding facility” (IMF/ World Bank 2005, 
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12). Hence the view of the IMF and The World Bank is that current 
facilities are sufficient to handle the need in this field. A more in-depth 
institutional assessment is necessary to provide a clear conclusion and this 
will not be undertaken here. It is nevertheless important to note that the 
loss of tariff revenues for some poor countries is a serious and legitimate 
concern related to trade liberalisation, and policies should be shaped with 
this in mind. On the other hand, the LDCs may be exempted from tariff 
reductions in DDA, and, secondly, countries do not lose tariff revenue 
from cutting the water in their tariffs (the difference between bound and 
applied rates), so more specific analysis is needed in order to establish 
when a real problem exists. 
 
9. Final comments 
 
The Geneva consensus is not there and its possible realisation depends on 
politics. In order to obtain a consensus, it is important to acknowledge that 
- there is a ”problem with trade”, that is on average larger for poor 
countries 
- the ”problem with trade” is not general and applying to all poor 
countries; in fact they apply to only a minority, and many developing 
countries have no problem with trade or benefit from it; 
- addressing supply-side issues is relevant and important but there is no 
quick fix and these are long-term concerns that should mainly be 
handled within existing institutions.  
Hence we have to obtain a realistic assessment about the virtues of trade, 
as well as the role that AfT can play. 
For the implementation od AfT, there are also a host of more specific 
issues related to implementation, efficiency and the division of labour 
between institutions. We have addressed some of these issues but certainly 
not all, and there are other contributions that  include more specific 
assessments (see reference list). 
The IF task force recommended that there should be no specific 
definition of AfT: In order to avoid the problem of delineation,  the task 
force suggested more or less that AfT is what countries name AfT. This is 
plausible as long as it is a matter of semantics, but – as noted – the IF 
should probably not start building roads and bridges. For the efficiency 
and implementation of AfT, it seems to be an advantage with clear 
definitions and ambitions rather than vague perceptions.  
In the current debate on AfT, some providers of AfT, e.g. the regional 
development banks, have argued that some AfT should be undertaken on a 
regional rather than a country-by-country basis (see e.g. IMF/ World Bank 
2005, 22). The AfT task force also supported this view. This is important 
in the context of country focus. For example, we have seen that several 
CIS states were on the ”negative list”. This includes Russia, but Russia is 
neither LDC, nor IDA only, nor low-income.  But for the poor neighbours 
of Russia, it may be particularly important that Russia’s trade regime is 
upgraded and reformed. The research literature provides solid support for 
the view that countries grow together; the development of your neighbours 
is crucial for your own development (see e.g. Maurseth 2003). Hence there 
are arguments for considering AfT in a regional context. In such a context, 
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it may also be wise to include large and important countries in regions, 
even if they are not on the list of priority recipients.  
AfT also faces all the problems of aid in general, and there is a risk of 
inefficiency and waste. Especially in the context of the DDA, where AfT 
may be expanded as an open or hidden side-payment in order to obtain 
agreement, there is a risk that  donations expand faster than the ability for 
implementation. This suggests that AfT should be scaled up gradually, so 
that there is a match between funds and ability. Here it should be recalled 
that even with the modest scale of IF, implementation problems have been 
considerable. Also here, there is no magic wand to eliminate such 
challenges. 
In principle, most aid is a subsidy and there should be a consideration 
of the overall welfare impact. In the case of the narrow AfT such as 
TRTA/CB, a standard argument is related to sunk export costs, thresholds 
or learning effects that make subsidies warranted. For example, Lederman 
et al. (2006) study export promotion agencies and find that for the median 
agency, 1$ of export promotion creates 300$ of exports. They nevertheless 
find that the impact fall with agency size so that ”small is beautiful” in this 
context. Consideration of such issues are relevant for all specific forms of 
aid. Such analysis is crucial for the final policy formulation, but has been 
beyond the scope of this more macro-oriented assessment of AfT.  
Coordination of AfT is important for efficiency, and the recent task 
forces have provided some recommendations. While the realism of  
creating a new and separate mega-supply-side AfT facility may be 
questioned, it might be an idea to work for stronger coordination of 
TRTA/CB, for example by considering to merge some institutions and 
create a clearer division of labour. For example, merging UNCTAD, ITC 
and IF could be considered; although we have doubts about the political 
realism of such a reform. The Panel of Eminent Persons (2006)  has 
suggested that UNCTAD should be the world’s think-tank on trade and 
development (see also UNCTAD 2006b). While many of the panel’s 
assesments are sensible, an additional issue is what change are required in 
the organisation if it is to take on such a new and enhanced role. At a time 
when the WTO is in deep crisis, UNCTAD basically maintains that core 
parts of the DDA agenda (related to the emerging consensus on 
manufacturing tariff cuts) are flawed, so here we do not only have 
confusion but also conflict. In our opinion, UNCTAD should remain an 
executive international organisation and possibly, an extended more 
specific and developed operational role on AfT could provide a sensible 
anchor.  
It should also be recalled that market access is a core precondition for 
the exports from developing countries. Hence AfT will not help if exports 
are stopped by trade restrictions. For the sake of policy coherence, AfT 
should be accompanied by improved market access for developing 
countries.  
For policy purposes, we would like to add that the classification of 
countries and the analysis undertaken to support our conclusions is a  
crude ranking with the purpose of obtaining knowledge about the 
magnitude of the ”problems with trade”. Countries could be listed 
according to other criteria, and other plausible metodologies might change 
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the picture. In practical policy, a much more detailed  analysis of the 
individual country is required. In our analysis, we have seen that there is 
great heterogeneity across countries, even for countries at similar income 
levels. For this reason, AfT should not be provided indiscriminately but 
according to a needs assessment – as underlined in the recent policy 
prescriptions for AfT. Finally, this paper has been written during a very 
short period of time, and extensive econometric analysis has been beyond 
the scope of the study. Some results are therefore tentative and should be 
followed up with more in-depth analysis. 
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Appendix A: Aid for Trade (AfT): Main current schemes and activities 
 
A. Special schemes and organisations with AfT as the core focus. 
IF (Integrated Framework) is an AfT programme which focuses on the 
Least-Developed Countries and is run jointly by six agencies: IMF, ITC, 
UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and the WTO. Linked to the PRSP 
(Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) process, a main purpose of IF since 
2001 has been to mainstream trade and trade policy into the policy of 
participating countries. For this purpose, so-called DTIS (Diagnostic 
Trade Integration Studies) are funded by IF. By August  2006, 42 LDCs 
participated in the process and 20 had completed their DTIS. Based on 
these, follow-up activities are to be undertaken, with funding from a 
second window of IF. IF started in 1997, and was reformed in 2001. Since 
then, contributions from bilateral and multilateral donores have been 
pooled in the IF Trust Fund. By March 2006, 35 million USD has been 
given to IFTF. There is currently a proposal on the table for an enhanced 
IF, planned to be launched before the end of 2006. The enhanced IF 
should be better organised at the country level and have significantly  
more funds for implementing the recommendations. While there have 
been suggestions to extend if to non-LDCs, this was not supported by the 
task force (WTO 2006b). In the IF activity, the World Bank is a core 
institution related to DTIS, while UNDP manages the trust fund. For more, 
see www.integratedframework.org.  
JITAP (Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme) is an AfT 
programme run by WTO, UNCTAD and ITC, focusing on African 
countries. JITAP I (1998-2002) covered 8 countries of which four non-
LDC (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Tunisia). JITAP II (from February 
2003) added eight nrew countries, of which twio were non-LDC 
(Botswana, Cameroon). JITAP II has a budget of 12.6 mill. USD. 
Contributions from various donors (including Norway) are pooled in a 
Common Trust Fund (CTF for the abbreviation-minded) with a 
corresponding steering group (CTF-SG!). The main focus of JITAP is 
capacity-building. Web page: www.jitap.org.  
TIM (Trade Integration Mechanism) is a scheme established by the IMF 
in 2004 in order to provide financing for Balance-of-Payments (BOP) 
difficulties that might arise from multilateral trade liberalisation. It is not a 
separate lending facility, but a policy to provide better access to existing 
funding schemes, by giving more favourable and predictable financing in 
relevant cases. TIM may only be used in order to mitigate BOP difficulties 
due to trade liberalisation by others – not a country’s own liberalisation. 
For example, preference erosion, or BOP difficulties if elimination of 
agricultural subsidies in other countries leads to higher import prices, 
would be covered. By October 2006, three countries (Bangladesh, 
Dominican Republic, Madagascar) had obtained TIM support. More 
information on  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tim.htm.  
STDF (Standards and Trade Development Facility) was established in 
2002 as a joint effort between FAO (United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization), OIE (the World Organization for Animal 
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Health),  the World Bank, WHO (World Health Organization)  and the 
WTO. STDF helps developing countries develop capacity related to 
international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, and the 
implementation of WTO rules in this area. STDF partly funds, and partly 
coordinates activities. From the STDF web page 
www.standardsfacility.org we find that 69 project grants or project 
preparations grants had been given. Budget figures are however not 
provided.  
ITC (International Trade Centre UNCTAD-WTO) is much larger than the 
specific schemes, with 213 employees and a budget of 49 million USD in 
2004, and extensive use of external consultants. While e.g. UNCTAD and 
the WTO undertake activities related to governments, the activity of ITC 
is more focused on business, business organisations, and export 
promotion. Web page: www.intracen.org.  
 
B. As part of broader activities. 
World Bank (www.worldbank.org): Trade-related activity is an important 
part of the WB’s regular activity.  According to IMF/ World Bank (2006, 
30), trade-related lending amounting to 1.6 billion USD had been 
approved for 2006. The composition of WB trade-related lending has 
changed considerably over time (IEG 2005); with a declining share for 
conditionality-related lending, and a larger share to institution-building 
(e.g. customs facilities) and physical infrastructure.  
The regional development banks: These have several activities related to 
trade. Some AfT may be related to regional integration schemes or 
regions, and the regional development banks may be particularly relevant 
in that context. For example, the IADB (Inter-American Development 
Bank) has regional integration as one of its main policy objectives (see 
IADB 2003, available at www.iadb.org ). The regional development banks 
also have technical assistance activities.  
IMF: In addition to TIM, the IMFs overall activity is to some extent trade-
related. For example, convertibilty is trade-facilitating, and lending for 
BOP imbalances is generally trade-related. The Compensatory Financing 
Facility (CFF) is related to reductions in export earnings or BOP 
difficulties due to commodity price fluctuations.  The IMF also has special 
lending faciltities for the poorest countries, and the process of 
”mainstreaming” trade into national development plans provides a link to 
such lending. For details, see www.imf.org.  
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
www.unctad.org ):  As evident from its name, trade and development is a 
major focus of UNCTAD. This includes intergovernmental contact to 
promote consensus, particularly among developing countries. UNCTAD 
also has programmes for export diversification, technical assistance, and 
related to trade and the environment. Given that trade in services is partly 
driven by FDI, UNCTAD’s activity related to investment is also relevant 
in the context of trade. 
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WTO (www.wto.org ): During the last years, technical assistance and 
training for developing countries has become a regular part of WTO’s 
activity. In 2004, the WTO had a regular budget of 5.6 million USD for 
such activity, plus voluntary trust fund contributions of 19.3 million USD. 
OECD has not undertaken much AfT as such, but plays an important role 
in the field of policy dialogue, donor coordination, analysis, standards for 
statistics and the like (see www.oecd.org ).  
UNDP:  Apart from managing the IF Trust Fund, UNDP has not been a 
major actor in the trade-related area. Given the core role of trade in 
development, it nevertheless seems as if the UNDP is stepping up projects 
in the field (www.undp.org).  
Sectorally or thematically specialised organisations: This includes 
organisations such as the WCO (World Customs Organization, 
www.wcoomd.org), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization, 
www.wipo.int), UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, www.unido.org ), FAO (United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, www.fao.org ) and others. In their particular 
areas, such organisations may play a role for AfT. Some regional trade 
blocs also have AfT activities.  
Bilateral aid: While a considerable part of AfT is undertaken via 
multilateral organisations, some countries – notably the EU – provides 
substantial AfT bilaterally. This is partly do to the focus on former 
colonies in EU development policy. The EU provides almost 1 billion 
EUR annually on AfT, of which a large share is bilateral aid (te Velde et 
al., 2006). 
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Statistical Appendix:  
 
The relationship between trade openness, income 
and growth 
 
A1. Measuring openness by exports or imports? 
 
In the analysis of openness and income levels, the trade/GDP ratio has 
frequently been used as a measure of openness (see e.g. Noguer and 
Siscart 2005). But should we use the import/GDP ratio, the export/GDP 
ratio or the trade/GDP ratio, i.e. (import+export)/GDP?  We will show that 
different measures may give different results.  
In simple trade models, balanced trade is frequently assumed, but this 
is not empirically realistic since imports may deviate from exports for 
several reasons.25 In our sample with data for 1975-2002 for 165 
countries, the import/GDP ratio (for goods and services) is on average 
41.7% whole the exports/GDP ratio is 35.3%. The trade balance/GDP 
ratio is -6.3% on average, while the absolute value of the trade 
balance/GDP ratio is on average 10.2%. A modest part of the difference 
can be attributed to the fact that import values include cost, insurance and 
freight (c.i.f) and are therefore larger than the corresponding export 
values. According to the literature, this gap amounts to a few percentage 
points of the trade value.26 On average in our sample, the absolute value of 
trade imbalances amount to approximately ¼ of the trade value, so there is 
no doubt that trade imbalances are important. Since exports and imports 
generally differ, it is therefore an issue in the analysis of trade openness 
and growth whether exports and imports are differently related to growth.  
In order to check the differential impact of exports and imports, we run 
some illustrative regressions. We use income per capita as the dependent 
variable, and check how this is affected by the imports/GDP ratio, the 
exports/GDP ratio, and the trade balance/GDP ratio. We then add a 
measure of country size to the same equations, for the reasons suggested 
above. In these illustrative regressions, we pool the data (cross-section and 
time series), giving 3904 observations. Table S1 shows the results. For the 
sake of brevity, we drop reporting the constant terms since they do not 
matter here. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 A trade imbalance has to be matched by a corresponding capital account imbalance. 
Trade may be imbalanced in the short run, corresponding to short-term capital account 
imbalances, or in the long run corresponding to long-term capital flows or aid. For 
example, aid or capital inflows may allow a trade deficit. And countries such as Norway, 
with large oil revenues and corresponding capital outflows, may have export surpluses. 
26 According to Wijnolst and Wergeland (1997, 244) the average difference between 
import and export prices was around 6% of the c.i.f. price in 1994, but varying strongly 
across sectors. 
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Table S1: Illustrative regressions on income level and openness 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) 
Number of observations: 3904 
Variables are in log form, with the trade balance variable expressed as ln(X/M), 
equivalent to ln(X/Y)-ln(M/Y), where X=exports, M=imports and Y=GDP. 
Parameter estimates, with T values in brackets below. 
Import/GDP Export/GDP Trade balance Equation ln(M/Y) ln(X/Y) ln(X/M) Adj. R
2 
(1) 0.17 (5.58) 
  0.01 
(2)  0.65 (26.98) 
 0.16 
(3a) 0.31 (12.01) 
 1.45 
(39.83) 0.29 
(3b)  0.31 (12.01) 
1.15 
(27.58) 0.29 
(4)   1.39 (0.27) 0.27 
 
While all the parameter estimates are statistically significant, the 
magnitude of the estimates as well as adjusted R2 vary considerably: 
- The import/GDP ratio alone (equation 1) ”explains” less than 1% of 
the variation in income levels.  
- The export/GDP ratio (equation 2) scores much higher, capturing 16% 
of the variation. 
- If the trade balance/GDP ratio is included in addition to import/GDP 
(3a) or export/GDP (3b), adjusted R2 jumps to 29%. 
- Equation (4) shows that the trade balance alone captures 27% of the 
income variation. 
Equations (1)-(4) therefore suggest that the impact of trade/GDP ratios can 
be decomposed into two elements; one about openness and one about 
competitiveness. In equations (3a-b), the estimates on imports/GDP and 
exports/GDP are by definition equal, and the value of 0.31 may be 
interpreted as saying that a 1% increase in the trade/GDP ratio (e.g. from 
10.0 to 10.1%) leads to a 0.31% increase in income, if we ”deduct” the 
competitiveness effect. The equations also suggest that unless the trade 
balance is included, the export/GDP ratio will capture some of the 
competitiveness effect. For this reasson, we shall use the imort/GDP ratio 
as a measure of openness in the analysis in the main text and later in this 
Appendix.  
A shortcoming of the results in Table S1 is that trade openness 
depends strongly on country size, which we have not taken into account. If 
there were only two countries in the world and trade between them was 
balanced, the larger country would by definition be less open. Generally, 
larger countries tend to be more closed. When analysing the impact of 
openness on income, we should therefore control for country size. Note 
that it is economic size rather than population that is relevant, so we 
should use GDP and not population as the variable. 
Country size may also affect the income level if firms in large 
countries have advantages due to their large home markets, or because of 
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externalities. Externalities may e.g. be due to labour market pooling (a 
good supply of differentiated labour, experts etc.), vertical linkages (a 
large domestic supply of inputs, machinery etc.), or knowledge spillovers 
(firms learn from each other som that productivity is higher if the industry 
is large). If home market effects or externalities are present, there may be 
a direct influence from country size on the income level. Again, it is GDP 
rather than population that is relevant.  
In order to illustrate the importance of this issue, and without checking 
what particular causality that is involved, we therefore add a country size 
variable to the equations above. As noted, it is economic size that matters, 
not population. We therefore add the log of GDP as a right-hand side 
variable in the equations above, and obtain equations (5)-(9).27  
 
Table S2: Illustrative regressions on income level and openness 
As above, with ln(Y) added to the equations. 
GDP Import/GDP Export/GDP Balance/GDP Eq. ln(Y) ln(M/Y) ln(X/Y) ln(X/M) Adj. R
2 
(5) 0.23 (32.03) 
   0.20 
(6) 0.38 (47.95) 
0.93 
(32.54) 
  0.38 
(7) 0.30 (49.60) 
 0.90 
(45.70) 
 0.48 
(8) 0.29 (37.82) 
0.85 
(32.58) 
 0.96 
(28.58) 0.48 
(8a) 0.29 (37.82) 
 0.85 
(32.58) 
0.11 
(2.50) 0.48 
(9) 0.15 (21.09) 
  1.08 
(28.54) 0.34 
 
Income per capita is obviously correlated with income, as shown in 
(5).  There is certainly a problem with endogeneity, which we do not 
address for the purposes here. When GDP is added in equations (6)-(9), 
the estimates on openness consistently increase to the range 0.85-0.93. 
Observe also that when GDP is included, the trade balance alone captures 
less of the income variation (compare (9) with (8a-b)). This is because on 
average, large countries tend to have a trade surplus; possibly suggesting 
that there are externalities or ”home market effects” present. For this 
reason, the trade/GDP ratios are also not exogeneous. 
The equations above were run with pooled data. The results are 
qualitatively similar if we run the regressions for each year individually; 
i.e. with pure cross-section data. As an example, we run equation (8) with 
annual data. The parameter estimates are statistically sgnificant at the 1% 
level or better in all cases, except for the constant terms in some cases (not 
reported above). Diagram S1 shows the estimates for ln(M/Y) during the 
period. Since the number of countries included generally increases over 
                                                 
27 If we use population as a measure of country size, and add this (in log form) as a right-
hand side variable in equations (1)-(4), it does not change the results very much. 
Population size barely contributes to explaining the income differences. 
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time due to better data availability as well as the formation of new 
countries (e.g. the new states  after the former Soviet Union), the 
regressions are also run with a more or less constant sample with income 
data for all years. This is shown in the curve without markers.28 
 
Diagram S1: The elasticity of income per capita with respect to 
openness, results from cross-section regressions 1975-2002
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
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1.15
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Full sample (N=106-163)
Stable sample (N=102-108)
 
There is a slight drop in this elasticity during the 1990s. Rodrigues (2006) 
maintains that ”If there was a relationship between openness and growth 
in the data, it seems to have disappeared during the period since 1990.” 
This is however referring to growth and not income levels; the diagram 
above suggests that the cross-section relationships is present also in the 
1990’s, but somewhat weaker. Some of the variation over time, especially 
some of the sharp drop in 1993-95, is due to the addition of new countries 
in the data set. Generally, the impact has varied around 1%, with a slight 
redustion over time. The drop in the early 1990s may possibly be due to 
the bad economic performance in Eastern Europe during some years, but 
we drop a more detailed analysis.  
These equations demonstrate the importance of model specification 
and problems of endogeneity in the analysis of trade openness and income. 
Hence our results here are tentative only and a more extensive analysis is 
required to address issues of causality, endogeneity and model 
specification. The results above are in line with those of Noguer and 
Siscart (2005), who concluded that there is a positive impact of openness 
on income  
Through this analysis, we have obtained the information we needed for 
the choice of variable in the further analysis: We use imports/GDP since it 
better reflects the impact of openness, rather than competitiveness, in 
settings where we do not control for the trade balance.  
 
                                                 
28 We do not report the details of these regressions here; these are available upon request. 
The average value of adjusted R2 for these 28 regressions is 0.50.  
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A2. Measuring the impact of changes in openness on growth 
 
For calculating the openness-income elasticities used in the main text, we 
run regressions of the form 
 
ln(GDP per capita)t = α1 + α2 ln (imports/GDP)t + εt 
 
wher t=1975,…, 2002 refers to the 28 years covered by the data, or less 
where data are missing for some years. The regressions are undertaken for 
each individual country in turn. We do not report the detailed results, but 
summarise them. Details may be provided to interested readers upon 
request. 
- The number of observations was 28 in  93 of the 165 cases and lower 
in the remaining oes, with an average of 23.7. 
- Adjusted R2 was on average 0.31. 
Table S3 shows the the number of significant estimates as well as their 
signs.  
 
Table S3: Elasticities of income per capita with respect to trade openness. 
Sign of elasticity Level of significance 
Number of 
countries % of countries 
1% level 62 37.6 
5% level 6 3.6 
10% level 6 3.6 Positive (104, 63%)
Not significant 30 18.2 
Not significant 26 15.8 
10% level 6 3.6 
5% level 6 3.6 Negative (61, 37%) 
1% level 23 13.9 
All countries  165 100 
 
Hence 44.8% of the cases were significantly positive with P-values below 
10%. 21.1% were negative with P values below 10%.  
Table S4 shows the top and bottom 50 estimates for the openness-
growth elasticity. 
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Table S4: Bottom and top 50 estimates of 
elasticities of income level with respect to openness. 
Parameter β from OLS regression Yt=α+βXt+ε; number of observations 28 in 110 cases (out of 165), average 
24.7. 
- Yt=log of GDP per capita, PPP, constant 1995 international $ 
- Xt=log of imports of goods ands services in % if GDP. 
- t – years from 1975 to 2002 
- Significance levels: *** = 1% level or better, **=5% level or better, *=10% level or better. 
- Data source: World Development Indicators 2004. 
 
Bottom 50 Top 50 
Country β Sign. level Y2000 Country β 
Sign. 
level Y2000 
St. Kitts and Nevis -2.91 *** 10389 Burundi 0.42 *** 552 
Cyprus -2.07 *** 15693 Togo 0.43 *** 1312 
Lesotho -1.93 *** 1994 Kazakhstan 0.44 *** 4215 
Botswana -1.75 *** 6911 Fiji 0.44 *** 4477 
Norway -1.63 *** 32228 Bangladesh 0.46 *** 1427 
Bahamas, The -1.62 *** 15306 Colombia 0.47 *** 5618 
St. Vincent & Grenadines -1.48 *** 4861 Eritrea 0.49 *** 743 
Tajikistan -1.42 *** 736 Uganda 0.49 ** 1164 
Armenia -1.25 *** 2222 Namibia 0.53 *** 5357 
Moldova -0.98 *** 1184 Nepal 0.54 *** 1216 
Kuwait -0.98 *** 14471 Cambodia 0.56 *** 1682 
Dominica -0.93 * 5470 Canada 0.56 *** 25456 
United Arab Emirates -0.87 *** 19860 Denmark 0.56 * 26883 
St. Lucia -0.83 ** 5126 Equatorial Guinea 0.59 *** 15510 
Ukraine -0.83 *** 3769 Niger 0.62 *** 686 
Pakistan -0.8 * 1751 Czech Republic 0.66 *** 12840 
Israel -0.79 *** 18895 Greece 0.66 *** 15280 
Djibouti -0.74 P>0.1 1769 El Salvador 0.69 *** 4307 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.67 *** 3253 Estonia 0.72 ** 9428 
Papua New Guinea -0.65 *** 2194 Spain 0.73 *** 18314 
Lebanon -0.64 *** 3866 Costa Rica 0.74 *** 8175 
Macao, China -0.63 *** 17559 Poland 0.75 *** 9114 
Oman -0.62 ** 11498 Sweden 0.75 *** 22498 
Japan -0.62 *** 23828 France 0.77 *** 23225 
Turkmenistan -0.53 * 3224 Kenya 0.83 P>0.1 922 
Burkina Faso -0.47 *** 931 Cote d'Ivoire 0.83 *** 1455 
Barbados -0.44 ** 14084 Sri Lanka 0.86 ** 3181 
Tonga -0.43 * 5787 Cape Verde 0.89 *** 4315 
Georgia -0.38 P>0.1 1722 Germany 0.89 *** 23913 
Latvia -0.35 P>0.1 6985 India 0.94 *** 2220 
Jordan -0.33 * 3597 Tunisia 0.94 *** 5754 
Vanuatu -0.32 ** 2855 United States 0.96 *** 31338 
Rwanda -0.3 *** 1019 United Kingdom 1.00 * 22652 
Uruguay -0.3 P>0.1 8130 Malaysia 1.01 *** 8217 
Bahrain -0.27 *** 14385 Belgium 1.04 *** 24250 
Nicaragua -0.26 ** 2279 China 1.06 *** 3547 
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Bottom 50 Top 50 
Country β Sign. level Y2000 Country β 
Sign. 
level Y2000 
Madagascar -0.26 *** 757 Austria 1.09 *** 25694 
Kyrgyz Republic -0.24 P>0.1 1431 Vietnam 1.12 *** 1854 
Congo, Rep. -0.21 P>0.1 884 Netherlands 1.14 *** 24833 
Solomon Islands -0.2 P>0.1 1726 Australia 1.19 *** 24013 
Guinea-Bissau -0.18 ** 729 Portugal 1.28 *** 15879 
Lithuania -0.17 P>0.1 7998 Thailand 1.32 *** 5846 
Russian Federation -0.17 P>0.1 6644 Indonesia 1.33 *** 2807 
Azerbaijan -0.17 P>0.1 2358 Mauritius 1.63 *** 8858 
Sierra Leone -0.16 P>0.1 427 Hong Kong, China 1.65 *** 23735 
Albania -0.15 P>0.1 3727 Malta 1.76 * 16482 
Benin -0.13 P>0.1 895 Chile 1.91 *** 8412 
Mali -0.13 P>0.1 683 Ireland 2.01 *** 27612 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.13 P>0.1 638 Slovenia 2.14 P>0.1 15239 
Belize -0.12 P>0.1 5124 Luxembourg 2.34 *** 51637 
Note: Income data for the United Arab Emirates is for 1998. 
 
In Table S5, we show 30 countries with below-median growth and 
an openness-income elasticity below –0.10. 
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Table S5: Problems with trade: 
30 countries with growth in per capita income below the median (1.19) and an income-openness elasticity at –0.10 or below 
 
Country 
Income-
openness 
elasticity 
Growth 
in per 
capita 
GDP 
Simple 
tariff 
average 
Import 
tariffs, % 
of tax 
revenue 
1980 
Export + 
imports 
% of 
GDP 
2002 
GDP per 
capita, 
2002 
(PPP) 
Income 
group 2005 LDC 
Small 
Island 
Dev. 
State 
(1) 
Small 
Island 
Dev. 
State 
(2) 
Land-
locked IDA 
Seve-
rely 
in-
debted
Former 
Soviet 
Rep. 
WTO 
Bahrain -0.27 0.11 4.92 50 146 15210 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kuwait -0.98 -2.15 3.89 26 88 14382 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
United Arab Emirates -0.87 -3.24    19860 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lithuania -0.17 -1.12 3.97  114 9145 Upper middle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Latvia -0.35 1.00 3.97  102 8161 Upper middle 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Uruguay -0.30 0.70 13.05 15 41 6939 Upper middle 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Russian Federation -0.17 -2.23 9.76  59 7289 Lower middle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Macedonia, FYR -0.11 -1.03 8.68  95 5735 Lower middle 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Belarus -0.10 0.01 11.04  143 4887 Lower middle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Ukraine -0.83 -4.15 6.84  108 4315 Lower middle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Azerbaijan -0.17 -1.07 8.13  95 2845 Lower middle 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Armenia -1.25 -0.87 2.30  77 2761 Lower middle 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Vanuatu -0.32 -1.11 13.57   2556 Lower middle 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Georgia -0.38 -2.43 6.93  67 2002 Lower middle 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Djibouti -0.74 -2.04 32.55 5  1766 Lower middle 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Turkmenistan -0.53 -2.32 3.88    Lower middle 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Nicaragua -0.26 -2.55 4.42 23 72 2187 Low 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Papua New Guinea -0.65 -0.34 4.69 16  2007 Low 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Mongolia -0.11 0.13 4.95  148 1514 Low 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Kyrgyz Republic -0.24 -1.97 4.84  82 1436 Low 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Solomon Islands -0.20 1.03  31  1409 Low 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Moldova -0.98 -7.80 4.12  133 1300 Low 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
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Country 
Income-
openness 
elasticity 
Growth 
in per 
capita 
GDP 
Simple 
tariff 
average 
Import 
tariffs, % 
of tax 
revenue 
1980 
Export + 
imports 
% of 
GDP 
2002 
GDP per 
capita, 
2002 
(PPP) 
Income 
group 2005 LDC 
Small 
Island 
Dev. 
State 
(1) 
Small 
Island 
Dev. 
State 
(2) 
Land-
locked IDA 
Seve-
rely 
in-
debted
Former 
Soviet 
Rep. 
WTO 
Rwanda -0.30 0.89 9.47 27 33 1126 Low 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Benin -0.13 1.04 11.63  40 950 Low 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Tajikistan -1.42 -5.52 8.12  130 866 Low 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Mali -0.13 0.72 11.63 16 73 820 Low 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Madagascar -0.26 -1.90 5.08 26 39 659 Low 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Guinea-Bissau -0.18 -0.85 11.63  123 630 Low 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.13 -4.71 11.90 23 40 578 Low 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Sierra Leone -0.16 -2.33 13.25 41 59 464 Low 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
                
Sum country groups        10 4 3 9 19 8 12 7 
Note: Income data for the United Arab Emirates are for 1998. 
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A3. Determinants of the ”problems with trade” 
 
In the text, we conclude that the factor that create a negative trade-growth 
relationship are the same as the factors that impedde growth. We support this 
conclusion by studying the correlations between our indicators of the openness-
growth relationship on one side, and a number of other country-related variables 
on the other. In Table S7 at the end of this Appendix, the correlations and data 
sources are shown. We study around 150 variables, but drop details and 
summarise the results only briefly. The selection of variables is guided by earlier 
research on trade and growth, and data availability/ time constraints. We use 
data on  
- education and technology 
- the quality of institutions (including corruption, the rule of law, efficiency of 
governance etc.) 
- the ”quality” of capital markets 
- health 
- country size 
- sectoral specialisation in production and trade (agriculture, manufacturing, 
services) 
- trade policy. 
For many aspects, we have data of good quality, but in some cases there are 
limitations. For example, we would have liked to have better data on trade 
policy changes over time, but this was not available so we only use data on the 
cross-section variation at the end of the period studied. Hence more can be done 
to make result more accurate, but that has to be a task for future work. 
For the chosen variables, we consider levels for various years during the 
period studied, mostly at the beginning and the end of the time period studied 
(1975-2002), or other years if this is necessary due to data availability. In 
addition, we check correlations with changes over time; mostly using the change 
over the whole period. A full-fledged econometric analysis is beyond the scope 
of the paper, so what we present is a tentative analysis based on correlations. 
Furthermore, there may be changes in the trend during the time period studied, 
e.g. that the 1990s are different from the 1980s, but a more detailed study of the 
changes over time is not undertaken.  
We correlate these numerous variables with the estimated trade elasticities 
(EL), as well as a dummy (NEG) for 30 negative cases (as in Table S5) and a 
similar dummy (POS) for 54 positive cases (positive openness-income elasticity 
and above-median economic growth). Since we include these dummies, we also 
report Spearman (rank) correlation coefficients. We drop reporting results for a 
number of variables of less interest or because they duplicate others, and finally 
report in Table S7 correlations with 113 variables. 
The two dummies are constructed by using growth rates in addition to EL. 
Hence an issue is whether the dummies are more correlated with growth-related 
aspects. In order to check if the variables behave differently, we examine the 
correlations between the six sets of correlation coefficients that we obtain. This 
is shown in Table S6. 
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Table S6: Correlation between six sets of correlation coefficients 
NEG POS EL Variable/ type 
Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman
Pearson 0.93 -0.76 -0.75 -0.71 -0.77 NEG 
Spearman  -0.73 -0.79 -0.70 -0.84 
Pearson   0.95 0.88 0.87 POS 
Spearman    0.80 0.92 
EL Pearson     0.88 
Note: The number of observations is 113 in all cases. P values are below 
0.0001 in all cases. 
 
Hence even if POS is more growth-related than EL due to its construction, the 
correlations obtained using POS are very close to those obtained using EL. This 
is shown by correlation coefficients in the range 0.80-0.92 between the four sets 
of correlations. Hence POS and EL results are strongly positively related, while 
results with NEG are generally the opposite, as we would expect. 
Hence if e.g. some variable is positively correlated with EL, it also tends to 
be positively correlated with POS and negatively correlated with NEG. Many 
variables conform to this expectation. There is, however, also another group 
where the correlations with EL and POS are highly significant, but where results 
for NEG are mixed due to the heterogeneity among the countries with NEG=1. 
For example, we find that armed conflict precludes a positive outcome, but does 
not necessarily imply that you are on the negative list.   
In the first group of variables, with an unambiguous impact on the positive 
as well as the negative, we find:  
► Developed capital markets: We use a number of different variables 
measuring this, related to FDI, stock and credit markets, and investment. While 
the results for FDI are partly mixed, there is on the whole a very consistent 
picture: More developed capital markets correspond to a more positive trade-
growth relationship.  
► Good institutions: We measure this using six different indicators of 
governance from Kaufmann et al. (2006). The results are very convincing; 
indicating that good institutions correspond with a positive trade-growth 
relationship. 
► Country size: It is easier for large countries to obtain a positive link between 
openness and income.  This is consistent with theories predicting that large 
countries have an advantage in international trade due to their large home 
market, or due to economies of scale at the industry level. 
► The sectoral composition of production and exports: In order to obtain a 
positive trade-income link, a country should have 
- little employment in agriculture, and more in manufacturing and services 
- a high share of manufacturing in exports. 
► Technology: A high share of high-tech exports, or machinery and 
equipment, is clearly positive. 
► Being landlocked: We include this here since it is a country group based on 
a ”physical” and exogenous criterion (not income etc.).   
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In the second group, with unambiguous results for POS and EL, but not NEG, 
we find:  
 
► Military conflict: We examine this using 
- military expediture in % of GDP 
- battle-deaths in % of the population over the period.29 
Measured in this way, conflict is negatively correlated with POS and EL, while 
the results for NEG are mixed. The significance levels are generally not very 
high, so the relationship is not very strong statistically speaking.  
► Health: Using various health indicators, we find positive correlations with 
POS and EL, while results for NEG are more mixed. An exception is population 
density, where an increase (equivalent to population growth) renders it more 
likely to be on the NEG list. 
► Education: Without good education, you cannot be on the positive list: For 
school enrolment, however, the relationship has become weaker over time.   
► Agricultural exports: countries with a high share of agriculture in exports in 
more seldom on the ”positive list”, but it is more ambiguous whether this will 
put them on the negative list.  
► Manufacturing imports: In later years of the period, a large share of 
manufacturing inm imports is positive. This could be related to technology 
transfer through imports of capital goods. Another reason could be multinational 
production.  
► Tariffs: High tariffs preclude a positive trade-growth relationship, but it is 
ambiguous whether they cause a negative link.30  
Results may vary and the classification into the two groups is not always crystal 
clear, but made based on our assessment. It may be that mixed results are due to 
data quality etc., so the classification should be considered as tentative. 
In Table S7, we also include results not reported here, such as for various 
country groups as well as related to trade, income and growth.31  
                                                 
29 For this purpose, we use the Battle Deaths Dataset, from the Centre for the Study of Civil 
War, PRIO, 2006. We sum up all battle deaths reported for the period 1975-2002, and divide by 
mean poulation. The purpose is to obtain a continuous variable that differentiates according to 
the severeness of a conflict. 
30 If import tariffs represent a large share of tax revenue, it is (weakly) true that countries will be 
on the negative list. This relationship is however weak, with P values for the Spearman 
correlation coefficients in the 0.10-0.12 range.  
31 With respect to trade and income, these are also involved in the construction of variables, so 
here we will find correlations by construction.  
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Dummy 30 ”negative” 
countries 
Dummy 54 ”positive” 
countries 
Income-openness 
elasticity 
Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
0.16 0.13 -0.21 -0.23 -0.11 -0.13 
0.1019 0.2015 0.0354 0.0202 0.2812 0.2058 1985 
104 104 104 104 104 104 
0.19 0.23 -0.09 -0.27 -0.14 -0.25 
0.0253 0.0069 0.2988 0.0016 0.1077 0.003 2002 
134 134 134 134 134 134 
0.09 0.15 -0.14 -0.28 0.01 0.03 
0.3687 0.151 0.1808 0.0059 0.9283 0.7686 
Aid, % of GNI 
 
 
 
 
Note: For each correlation, the 
upper figure is thecorrelation 
coefficient. The figure in the 
middle is the P value. The lower 
figure is the number of 
observations used. 
Change 
93 93 93 93 93 93 
1 Aid 
0.21 0.06 -0.17 -0.17 -0.29 -0.29 
0.0262 0.55 0.0822 0.0716 0.0024 0.0028 1990 
107 107 107 107 107 107 
0.01 0.06 -0.20 -0.14 -0.27 -0.27 
0.9509 0.5374 0.0242 0.127 0.002 0.0026 2000 
124 124 124 124 124 124 
-0.21 -0.22 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 
0.0526 0.0372 0.4542 0.3476 0.4821 0.4849 
Military expenditure (% of GNI) 
Change 
89 89 89 89 89 89 
1 
-0.01 0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 -0.20 
0.9013 0.1418 0.2339 0.0695 0.1733 0.0518 Battle deaths in period, as % of 
mean population 1975-2002 98 
 98 98 98 98 98 
2 
Conflict 
 
Appendix Table S7: What determines whether there is a positive link between openness and income? 
Data sources: 
(1) World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank 
(2) Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, 2006: The Battle Deaths Dataset.  
(3) Classifications used in Melchior (2005), based on various sources. 
(4) Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, 2006, Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005. World Bank. 
(5) Own calculations based on tariff data from TRAINS (UNCTAD) and the IDB/CTS (WTO) databases. 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.04 -0.24 0.06 0.00 0.19 0.26 
0.7164 0.0166 0.5645 0.9847 0.071 0.0098 1975 
96 96 96 96 96 96 
-0.04 -0.07 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.08 
0.5819 0.3768 0.1464 0.1767 0.0044 0.3072 2002 
153 153 153 153 153 153 
-0.10 -0.23 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.17 
0.3703 0.0297 0.0982 0.0225 0.4874 0.1189 
Foreign direct investments, 
net inflows as % of GNI 
Change 
89 89 89 89 89 89 
-0.23 -0.21 0.02 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 
0.0122 0.0234 0.8306 0.7275 0.142 0.568 1980 
118 118 118 118 118 118 
-0.15 -0.15 0.17 0.27 -0.08 0.14 
0.0642 0.0569 0.0382 0.0006 0.3166 0.0851 2001 
153 153 153 153 153 153 
-0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.24 0.05 0.17 
0.9231 0.9206 0.2065 0.0154 0.6488 0.0816 
Gross fixed capital formation, 
% of GDP 
Change 
104 104 104 104 104 104 
-0.17 -0.18 0.33 0.49 0.19 0.30 
0.105 0.0793 0.0012 <.0001 0.0716 0.004 Stocks traded, trade value as % of GDP 2000 
93 93 93 93 93 93 
-0.21 -0.22 0.31 0.36 0.05 0.20 
0.0351 0.022 0.0012 0.0002 0.6018 0.0437 1975 
104 104 104 104 104 104 
-0.28 -0.29 0.40 0.40 0.24 0.25 
0.0005 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0027 0.0015 
Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
2002 
155 155 155 155 155 155 
1 Capital markets 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.27 0.06 0.15 
0.5431 0.3677 0.3663 0.0082 0.5582 0.1451 Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) Change 
98 98 98 98 98 98 
1 Capital markets 
0.10 0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.08 
0.2094 0.2094 0.1284 0.1284 0.4906 0.339 Least Developed Countries (dummy) 2005 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.15 
0.8248 0.8248 0.723 0.723 0.0198 0.0515 Small island developing states, definition 1 (dummy)  
164 164 164 164 164 164 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.15 
0.7658 0.7658 0.9421 0.9421 0.0138 0.0557 Small island developing states, definition 2 (dummy)  
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.16 0.16 -0.24 -0.24 -0.16 -0.13 
0.0376 0.0376 0.0016 0.0016 0.0422 0.0947 Landlocked countries (dummy)  
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.20 0.20 -0.25 -0.25 -0.17 -0.20 
0.0112 0.0112 0.001 0.001 0.0347 0.0085 IDA only (dummy) 2005 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.15 0.15 -0.23 -0.23 -0.09 -0.11 
0.0636 0.0636 0.0035 0.0035 0.2761 0.152 Low income group of countries (dummy) 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.22 -0.22 -0.10 -0.10 
0.9171 0.9171 0.0046 0.0046 0.1878 0.1854 Severely indebted (dummy) 2004 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
3 
 Country group 
0.05 0.02 -0.23 -0.24 -0.04 -0.06 
0.5566 0.8026 0.0041 0.0036 0.6226 0.4688 Crude death rate per 1000 people, % of population 1975 
150 150 150 150 150 150 
1 Health 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.08 -0.09 0.34 0.36 0.14 0.20 
0.3352 0.2621 <.0001 <.0001 0.094 0.0145 1975 
151 151 151 151 151 151 
-0.09 -0.16 0.38 0.42 0.15 0.20 
0.2477 0.0413 <.0001 <.0001 0.0509 0.0109 2002 
165 165 165 165 165 165 
-0.08 -0.11 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.07 
0.3483 0.1639 0.039 0.0863 0.115 0.4061 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Change 
151 151 151 151 151 151 
-0.05 -0.20 0.01 0.32 -0.01 0.19 
0.5304 0.0196 0.9265 <.0001 0.9387 0.023 1975 
141 141 141 141 141 141 
-0.09 -0.15 0.21 0.26 0.16 0.14 
0.2577 0.0605 0.0087 0.0007 0.0378 0.0757 2002 
161 161 161 161 161 161 
0.36 0.32 -0.40 -0.49 -0.21 -0.29 
<.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.012 0.0006 
Population density (people per 
square km) 
Change 
139 139 139 139 139 139 
0.09 0.09 -0.32 -0.35 -0.16 -0.22 
0.2906 0.2608 <.0001 <.0001 0.0411 0.0059 1980 
154 154 154 154 154 154 
0.14 0.15 -0.36 -0.43 -0.14 -0.22 
0.0793 0.0525 <.0001 <.0001 0.0791 0.0042 2002 
162 162 162 162 162 162 
0.16 0.18 -0.41 -0.42 -0.23 -0.22 
0.0542 0.0235 <.0001 <.0001 0.005 0.0059 
Infant mortality rate, per 1000 
births 
Change 
154 154 154 154 154 154 
1 Health 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.11 -0.07 0.33 0.28 0.15 0.14 
0.1605 0.3646 <.0001 0.0004 0.0588 0.0832 Public health expenditure, % of GDP 2000 
161 161 161 161 161 161 
0.09 0.07 -0.24 -0.17 -0.10 -0.01 
0.2684 0.3834 0.0015 0.0313 0.2238 0.8835 Crude death rate per 1000 people 2002 
165 165 165 165 165 165 
1 Health 
0.03 -0.12 0.26 0.34 0.08 0.23 
0.7694 0.1836 0.0051 0.0002 0.4172 0.0153 1975 
115 115 115 115 114 114 
-0.19 -0.23 0.46 0.44 0.35 0.31 
0.0145 0.0034 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 2002 
158 158 158 158 157 157 
-0.47 -0.53 0.49 0.62 0.23 0.33 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0025 <.0001 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(Note:  Due to limited data are 
growth rates calculated for a 
shorter period for some countries) 
Growth 
1975-2002 
165 165 165 165 165 165 
1 Income level 
-0.19 -0.18 0.39 0.38 0.17 0.23 
0.017 0.0187 <.0001 <.0001 0.0336 0.0034 1996 
162 162 162 162 162 162 
-0.18 -0.19 0.35 0.36 0.16 0.22 
0.0215 0.0158 <.0001 <.0001 0.0404 0.004 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.05 0.06 -0.16 -0.19 -0.05 -0.10 
0.5348 0.4293 0.045 0.0154 0.4997 0.1904 
Voice and accountability 
Change 
162 162 162 162 162 162 
-0.11 -0.10 0.31 0.34 0.17 0.21 
0.1841 0.2297 <.0001 <.0001 0.0294 0.009 Political stability 1996 
159 159 159 159 159 159 
4 
 Institutions 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.09 -0.10 0.30 0.32 0.08 0.12 
0.2748 0.2029 <.0001 <.0001 0.3064 0.1109 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
0.5104 0.4995 0.7624 0.7644 0.7104 0.5904 
Political stability 
Change 
159 159 159 159 159 159 
-0.28 -0.29 0.50 0.49 0.33 0.35 
0.0003 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 1996 
161 161 161 161 161 161 
-0.24 -0.24 0.45 0.43 0.19 0.21 
0.0016 0.0022 <.0001 <.0001 0.017 0.0065 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.11 0.14 -0.11 -0.12 -0.27 -0.26 
0.1746 0.0764 0.1593 0.134 0.0004 0.0009 
Government effectiveness 
Change 
161 161 161 161 161 161 
-0.27629 -0.24637 0.42806 0.43302 0.32438 0.35911 
0.0004 0.0016 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 1996 
162 162 162 162 162 162 
-0.22 -0.21 0.41 0.41 0.18 0.23 
0.0048 0.0069 <.0001 <.0001 0.021 0.0035 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
-0.09 -0.09 0.27 0.28 0.00 0.07 
0.272 0.2527 0.0006 0.0003 0.9776 0.4091 
Regulatory quality 
Change 
162 162 162 162 162 162 
-0.26 -0.26 0.47 0.44 0.28 0.31 
0.0012 0.0015 <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 0.0001 Rule of law 1996 
151 151 151 151 151 151 
4 Institutions  
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.22 -0.22 0.44 0.41 0.18 0.18 
0.0054 0.0056 <.0001 <.0001 0.0204 0.0182 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.07 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.01 
0.3851 0.298 0.0604 0.0544 0.8296 0.8558 
Rule of law 
Change 
151 151 151 151 151 151 
-0.29 -0.26 0.48 0.47 0.31 0.33 
0.0007 0.0022 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 1996 
138 138 138 138 138 138 
-0.20 -0.19 0.41 0.39 0.16 0.17 
0.0112 0.0149 <.0001 <.0001 0.0351 0.026 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
0.17 0.19 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 
0.0419 0.0287 0.7943 0.444 0.3021 0.1739 
Control of corruption 
Change 
138 138 138 138 138 138 
4 
 Institutions 
-0.24 -0.34 0.14 0.33 0.13 0.28 
0.0215 0.0009 0.1731 0.0013 0.2055 0.0053 1975 
95 95 95 95 95 95 
-0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 
0.4784 0.5114 0.9894 0.8203 0.8863 0.8051 2000 
67 67 67 67 67 67 
-0.03 -0.08 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.08 
0.7637 0.4739 0.286 0.5855 0.6706 0.4694 
Tax revenue, % of GDP 
Change 
80 80 80 80 80 80 
1 Public sector 
-0.09 -0.27 0.20 0.39 0.12 0.38 
0.2442 0.0004 0.0107 <.0001 0.1209 <.0001 GDP, 2002, current USD 2002 
163 163 163 163 163 163 
1 Country size 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.11 -0.24 0.25 0.36 0.17 0.38 
0.1753 0.0019 0.001 <.0001 0.0253 <.0001 GDP, PPP 2002 
164 164 164 164 164 164 
-0.08 -0.17 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.29 
0.2874 0.0272 0.009 0.0169 0.0421 0.0002 Mean population, 1975-2002 1975-2002 
166 166 166 166 165 165 
1 Country size 
0.19 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.03 0.01 
0.0413 0.0159 0.0364 0.0554 0.7385 0.8768 1975 
112 112 112 112 112 112 
0.10 0.21 0.15 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 
0.2946 0.0317 0.1263 0.1825 0.8616 0.6095 2000 
106 106 106 106 106 106 
-0.15 -0.24 -0.20 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 
0.1211 0.0126 0.0396 0.1446 0.8843 0.6934 
Literacy rate, adult total, % of 
people aged 15 or above 
Change 
106 106 106 106 106 106 
-0.17 -0.19 0.40 0.42 0.25 0.32 
0.0568 0.0365 <.0001 <.0001 0.0064 0.0003 1975 
122 122 122 122 122 122 
-0.13 -0.16 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.19 
0.1276 0.0599 0.0093 0.0171 0.198 0.0198 2000 
148 148 148 148 148 148 
0.06 0.11 -0.30 -0.35 -0.15 -0.23 
0.5009 0.2651 0.0016 0.0002 0.1271 0.0152 
School enrolment, primary, % 
gross 
Change 
111 111 111 111 111 111 
-0.17 -0.17 0.40 0.41 0.22 0.28 
0.0656 0.0556 <.0001 <.0001 0.0151 0.0017 School enrolment, secondary, % gross 1975 
124 124 124 124 124 124 
1 Skills 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.03 -0.01 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.10 
0.7491 0.9405 0.0118 0.0511 0.2941 0.2599 2000 
129 129 129 129 129 129 
-0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 
0.7081 0.8568 0.346 0.303 0.2422 0.5749 
School enrolment, secondary, % 
gross 
Change 
93 93 93 93 93 93 
-0.19 -0.21 0.40 0.41 0.19 0.24 
0.0512 0.028 <.0001 <.0001 0.0513 0.0105 1975 
109 109 109 109 109 109 
0.04 0.04 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.14 
0.7045 0.7186 0.028 0.025 0.1825 0.149 2000 
108 108 108 108 108 108 
-0.06 -0.33 -0.07 0.26 -0.10 0.32 
0.5701 0.0008 0.5151 0.0097 0.3294 0.0013 
School enrolment, tertiary, % 
gross 
Change 
98 98 98 98 98 98 
-0.21 -0.21 0.42 0.39 0.22 0.04 
0.0082 0.0081 <.0001 <.0001 0.0045 0.6934 2002 
158 158 158 158 158 106 
0.02 0.10 -0.24 -0.42 -0.12 0.25 
0.8607 0.3083 0.0108 <.0001 0.2 0.0015 
Internet users per 1000 people 
Change 
1995-2002 
110 110 110 110 110 158 
1 Skills 
0.10 0.09 -0.13 -0.10 -0.04 -0.22 
0.3094 0.3614 0.1806 0.3032 0.7044 0.0191 1975 
106 106 106 106 106 110 
-0.06 -0.09 -0.27 -0.18 -0.16 -0.05 
0.4678 0.3007 0.0018 0.0352 0.0698 0.6144 
Food exports, % of merchandise 
exports 
2000 
133 133 133 133 133 106 
1 Specialisation 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.08 -0.13 0.41 0.42 0.14 -0.06 
0.4676 0.2454 0.0002 0.0001 0.2216 0.5126 1975 
79 79 79 79 79 133 
-0.09 -0.09 0.38 0.39 0.26 0.26 
0.4224 0.4222 0.0006 0.0005 0.0219 0.0624 1995 
76 76 76 76 76 54 
0.16 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.30 
0.2375 0.3021 0.3084 0.2409 0.3302 0.008 
Machinery and transport 
equipment, % of value added in 
manufacturing 
Change 
1975-95 
57 57 57 57 57 79 
-0.19 -0.21 0.38 0.39 0.17 0.06 
0.0502 0.0312 <.0001 <.0001 0.0744 0.6411 1975 
105 105 105 105 105 57 
-0.24 -0.24 0.47 0.46 0.27 0.37 
0.0089 0.0069 <.0001 <.0001 0.0022 <.0001 2001 
122 122 122 122 122 119 
0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.04 0.31 
0.7742 0.4156 0.2185 0.2849 0.7284 0.0004 
Manufacturing exports, % of 
merchandise exports 
Change 
89 89 89 89 89 122 
-0.03 -0.05 -0.15 -0.19 0.11 0.22 
0.78 0.5927 0.1135 0.0515 0.2633 0.0241 1975 
106 106 106 106 106 105 
-0.39 -0.34 0.39 0.42 0.33 -0.07 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.439 2000 
132 132 132 132 132 123 
-0.04 -0.10 -0.01 0.45 -0.25 -0.09 
0.6759 0.3399 0.9492 <.0001 0.0194 0.4042 
Manufacturing imports, % of 
merchandise imports 
Change 
90 90 90 90 90 90 
1 Specialisation 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
0.27 0.24 -0.42 -0.43 -0.23 0.20 
0.0126 0.0303 <.0001 <.0001 0.0352 0.0476 1980 
84 84 84 84 84 103 
0.32 0.33 -0.18 -0.25 -0.19 0.28 
0.0046 0.0038 0.1265 0.0326 0.1046 0.0127 
Employment in agriculture, % of 
total employment 
2000 
75 75 75 75 75 76 
-0.04 0.07 -0.18 -0.22 -0.30 -0.04 
0.7316 0.512 0.0942 0.0344 0.0047 0.7902 Food exports, % of merchandise exports 
Change 
1975-2000 
90 90 90 90 90 42 
-0.28 -0.27 0.41 0.40 0.19 -0.34 
0.0112 0.0123 0.0001 0.0002 0.0763 0.0017 1980 
84 84 84 84 84 84 
-0.26 -0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19 -0.28 
0.0251 0.1079 0.1291 0.2037 0.1059 0.0167 2000 
75 75 75 75 75 75 
-0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.11 0.13 0.19 
0.8353 0.8531 0.9758 0.4657 0.3918 0.018 
Employment in industry (% of 
total employment) 
Change 
46 46 46 46 46 149 
-0.22 -0.23 0.39 0.38 0.24 0.30 
0.0423 0.0356 0.0003 0.0003 0.0278 0.0053 1980 
84 84 84 84 84 84 
-0.28 -0.32 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.14 
0.0162 0.0056 0.1623 0.0953 0.219 0.2444 2000 
75 75 75 75 75 75 
-0.20 -0.26 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
0.2026 0.091 0.5666 0.9692 0.9163 0.8226 
Employment in services, % of 
total employment 
Change 
42 42 42 42 42 46 
1 Specialisation 
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Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
0.32 0.25 -0.18 -0.19 -0.15 0.24 
0.0002 0.0043 0.0412 0.027 0.0859 0.0396 2000 
132 132 132 132 132 75 
-0.03 0.09 -0.11 -0.33 0.00 -0.10 
0.7651 0.396 0.3198 0.0013 0.9691 0.3901 
Fuel imports (% of merchandise 
imports) 
Change 
1975-2000 
90 90 90 90 90 80 
0.13 0.15 -0.24 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17 
0.1541 0.0878 0.0086 0.3095 0.0576 0.0533 Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 2000 
123 123 123 123 123 132 
0.01 0.06 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.33 
0.9433 0.6683 0.0483 0.0843 0.0183 0.0024 1990 
54 54 54 54 54 84 
-0.13 -0.18 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.42 
0.1537 0.0492 0.0003 <.0001 0.0004 <.0001 
High-echnology exports, % of 
manufacturing exports 
2001 
119 119 119 119 119 132 
-0.24 -0.20 0.25 0.30 0.16 0.06 
0.0147 0.0467 0.0099 0.0024 0.0999 0.5262 1975 
103 103 103 103 103 106 
-0.23 -0.22 0.28 0.31 0.17 -0.01 
0.0057 0.0082 0.0005 0.0001 0.0441 0.9247 2001 
149 149 149 149 149 89 
-0.23 -0.18 0.22 0.23 0.20 -0.10 
0.0223 0.0807 0.0331 0.0221 0.0559 0.3497 
Services etc., % of of GDP 
Change 
95 95 95 95 95 90 
1 Specialisation 
-0.05 -0.04 -0.16 -0.20 -0.06 0.23 
0.5173 0.6559 0.053 0.0107 0.424 0.0233 Simple tariff average, ad valorem tariffs 2001-2005 
155 155 155 155 155 95 
5 Trade policy 
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Dummy 30 ”negative” 
countries 
Dummy 54 ”positive” 
countries 
Income-openness 
elasticity 
Table S7 continued… 
 
Variable 
Year 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Data 
source 
Variable  
related to: 
-0.03 -0.06 -0.20 -0.24 -0.21 -0.09 
0.7646 0.5271 0.0226 0.0054 0.0173 0.2789 Weighted tariff average, ad valorem tariffs 2001-05 
130 130 130 130 130 155 
5 
0.13 0.17 -0.43 -0.43 -0.42 -0.17 
0.222 0.1069 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0582 1975 
95 95 95 95 95 130 
0.11 0.15 -0.36 -0.37 -0.33 -0.41 
0.2684 0.1166 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 <.0001 1980 
105 105 105 105 105 95 
0.19 0.21 -0.40 -0.39 -0.27 -0.31 
0.1173 0.0881 0.0007 0.001 0.0241 0.0014 
Import duties, % of tax revenue 
Change 
69 69 69 69 69 105 
1 
-0.17 -0.17 0.14 0.14 0.15 -0.30 
0.0351 0.0351 0.0778 0.0778 0.0635 0.0119 WTO membership (dummy) 2005 
155 155 155 155 155 69 
WTO 
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